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Introduction
Transaction Cost Economics provides a powerful framework for understanding the
development of governance structures and institutions we can see in the modern market
economies. After Coase's insights n L937 this new theory of economic organization has been
developed in recent 15-20 years, and reshaped fundamentally principles foi public policy and
business strategy formation. Postulates of the neoclassical economics have been-reexamined-and a
substantial part of economic expenditures - the tral$action cosls have been introduced into
economic analysis. Types of transactions and origin of costs associated with them have been
classified. Critical dimensions of different transactions have been identified. Alternative market,
contractual and hierarchical arrangements for organizations of transacting have been specified.
Most recently the Transaction Cost Economics has been implemented in -studying out
institutional structure of farm production and "quite revolution" in agricultural organizational
forms. Attempts have been made to specify character of transactions in agraian sphere, and to
study managerial economics of vertically coordinated agro organizations. Substantial results have
been achieved in understanding motives for contract choice in agricultural inputs supply and
marketing transactions. However, this new developing concept has not been completely applied to
the agrarian sphere to examine governance mechanisms and factors for institutional modernization.
Besides most of research to date has been theoretical and limited to separate kinds of agranan
transactions.
_ 
Goal of this project has been to incorporate the transacting costs minimizing principle to the
Japanese agraian economy and to show that the Japanese agraian economy is a transaction costs
economy. {apanese ,agriculture gives us unique examples for institutional development and big
varieties of modes for orgunization of transactions. Systematic study of this reach experience
would contribute substantially to development of the Transaction Costs Economics. On the other
hand implementation of the transaction cost minimizing framern'ork to the agrarian area would
picture all development of governance forms in the Japanese farming, their current problems and
prospects. Traditional Agricultural Economics has failed to address why there are different
organizations in market based agraian economy, which factors determine the type and size of farm
organizations, when the Government intervention in agrarian transactions is necessary etc.
As specialization and diversification of farming develop individuals need increasingly to
exchange their products, activity,.. and own resources - they have to transact with each other. In
modem economies the costs associated with various transactions take a big part of all social
expenditures. That is why development of costs minimizing modes for transacting becomes an
important part of business management and in the economic theory. IndiViduals can use market to
coordinate their hansactions or they can design special organization to transact through. Which
mode of transacting they will chose depends on costs minimizing potential of different forms.
Apparently for various kinds of transactions quite different transacting modes will be effective. For
instance, a farmers markets chinese cabbage in a wholesale market and use market mode to
coordinate his marketing transactions with other individuals. However, the same farmer
participates in a cooperative to organize his inputs supply transacting through this joint ownership
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mgq".. Accordingly_ size of farm (and farm organizations) becomes bigger when some costs
minimizing potential of internal mode exists and a farmer integrates piJviously organized by
market transactions.
Our Transaction Cost Economics approach has put agraian transacting in the center of
economic analysis. Origin of the costs for transacting in the market place, and through different
bilateral and multilateral organizations has been classified. Macroeconomics factors for lmergency,
evolution and failure of 
-altemative governance structure have been examined in complrativetransacting costs economizing way. Our study has been based on behavioral assumptibns for
agraian agents such as bounded rationality, opportunism, reputation consideration.s. Critical
dimensions of agrarian transactions (frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity) according to with
transaction costs differ has been clarified. Costs for using of variouslransacting modes have been
put along technology in defining the effective horizontal and vertical boundariei of farm and farm
organizations. Ultimate objective has been to develop effective modes for organization of different
types of agraian transactions and to estimate the potential of various organizational arrangements
to save on transacting costs. In this way we have tried to determine which agraiantransactions are
to be organized by market, which of them would be vertically integrated through different
contractual and organizational devices, and where market and private initiatives fail, and therefore a
public third party intervention in agrarian transaction is ne-cessary. As a result more effective
framework for business organization formation and agraian policy development have been
proposed.
This project has contributed to the Agricultural Economics in both conceptual and empirical
respects: a l9w transaction costs dimension of economic relationships in agrarian area has been
incorporated into theoretical analyses; main assumptions have been tested thiough individual case
studies of organization of different kinds of agraian transacting; altemative structures for
organization of various types of agrarian transactions have been pioposed; microfondations of
macroeconomics have been reexamined and more realistic proipects for organizational
development in Japanese agriculture have been presented.
- 
Transacting costs economizing approach has helped us to understand why there are so
maly kinds o! farmg in Japan and part time farming phenomenon; rn hy some farmers buy inputs
and other produce them; when farmers buy equipment and when they pay for machinery service
luPply; what is a reason for permanent labor contracts and why- temporary labor has beenimportant in some productions;why some farmers sell products and-other process them; when u,e
have independent tamily operatiols and when contract system or totally integrated business; whygroup farming exists and the role of informai contracts in the Japanese society; why part time
farmers rely on cooperatives for input supply and marketing whlie full time farmeis look for
market transacting;why common organizations and community institutions have been so important
in 1ce_ production; why lease would be the most likely way for development of agriculture; why
agricultural cooperatives exist and what should be right direction for their reorganization; why such
institutions as quality standards and wholesale markets have been developed by the Government;
u'hy technological innovations are free for farmers and what should be future role of agraian
research potential; what are prospects for development of national agranan transactions and what
should the Government role be.
It has not been easy to test the Transaction Cost Economics principles in Japanese
agriculture. Firstly, this newly developed concept has not been cornpletely implemenled to
agraian area._ Therefore we have got to develop a little bit methodology and to find oul rn ays to test
organizational developqent against trzrnsaction cost criteria. Second, traditional accounting and
statistical data are not suitable for analysis of transacting economizing, and some of the official data
are not reliable. Tha! is why much of our study has been based on data collected through
intewiews with participants in agrarian transactions and through studying out typical and
prospective forms of transacting. Third, much of prospective organizations have not get to their
mature stage and spectrum of factors for their development has not been observable. This lack of
historical prospective may put some of our conclusions behind the pace of real life development.
Forth, there have been many non economical factors for .institutional innovation and
interdisciplinary approach should be undertaken. That is why our study contributes to see only a
part of complicated transacting structures (including great varieties of non economic transactions)
that characterize lapanese rural society.
Three kinds of data representing different sides of agraian transactions and types of their
organization has been used. First, available statistical and Census data for land and labor
transactions, for contract service transactions, and marketing transactions in Yachio machi.
Second, data from the Iand Committee on registered land ownership and land transactions in
Nakatsubo hamlet. Third, data about critical dimensions of agrarian transactions and kinds of their
organizations from personal interviews with number of farmers, Municipality officials, managers
of the Cooperative and other farm organizations, Irader of the farm group, Hamlet leader, Director
of Extension Office.
Yachio machi and Nakatsubo hamlet have been chosen as a representative for typical
farming structure in Kanto area with predominance of vegetable and rice productions. In this area
agranan transaction structure has been characterized with dynamic institutional innovations during
the last 20-30 years. With assistance of the Hamlet Lnader and City officials nine farmers from
Nakatsubo have been selected and interviewed. Among them are the Manager of one of the biggest
farm (Agrocorporation) in Japan, six business farmers and two part time farmers. This sample has
given us a full picture of farming structure and prospects for organizational modemization in the
area. Also data from our interviews with a number of farmers, leaders of farm groups and
managers of farm organizations in Hokkaido, Kyushu, Nagano prefecture, and Tsukuba areahave
been extensively used in the analysis.
We have tried to determine existing types and intensity of labor, land, input and service
supply transactions, capital and insurance supply transactions, and marketing transactions. We
have got full classification of all variety of formal and informal contractual arrangements, hybrid
and unified organizations, interlinked and trilateral governance modes for organization of different
agraian transactions. Attempt has been made to find critical dimensions of different agraian
transactions and microeconomic factors responsible for the transaction costs. This have been done
according to type and size of farms, structure of production, and kind of transacting modes.
Relationships between development of agricultural technology, markets for agricultural products,
agraian policy of the Government, and development of organizational forms for different agraian
transactions have been elaborated. We have tried to estimate factors for development of different
farmers, markets and government organizations, and their role for improvement of the efficiency
of.agrarian transacting. Attempt has been made to make some generalization about transaction costs
minimizing prospects for development of agraian structures in the conditions of liberalizing
agraian policy.
I own very much for overall contribution of Dr.Nobuhiro Tsuboi whose role for designing
and carrying out this pruject has been extremely important. Without his strong personal
involvement in all stages of the project, and extensive use of his big professional experience this
study could not have been done. I would like to thank to Shigeki Yokoyama whose expertise and
great assistance during my research help too much this project to be completed effectively. I extend
my gratitude to zrll colleagues in the Department of Farm Management of the National Agriculture
Research Center for their ideas, comments and contributions for the success of my study in Japan.
I own very much to many researchers from the National Research Institutes of Agricultural
Economics and the Norinchukin Research Institute in Tokyo, Japan lnternational Research Center
for Agricultural Sciences in Tsukuba, Sapporo and Obihiro Experimental Stations, Kyushu
Universities and Tokyo University of Agriculture for productive discussions and contributions to
clarify complex agricultural development in Japan. I appreciate very much my meeting with many
farmers, farm groups leaders, managers of cooperatives and other organizations, and official from
different govemmental institutions around the country. Their first hand information and sincere
opinions have been ultimate test and invaluable source of ideas for project development.
Despite of big opportunities my own language inproficiency has impeded me to take all
benefits from those meetings and extended Japanese literature. Consequently many parts of the
projects have not been as well deliberated as I initially intended. Also there may be mistakes in
some of the conclusions as a result of my misinterpretation of complicated Japanese farming
structure. All shortfalls of the study should be considered my personal failure to use provided
excellent opportunities for research and to explore the potential that the Transaction Cost
Economics concept contains.
Transaction Cost Economics of Japanese Agrarian Economy
Advantages of specialization and division of labor have been well known since ancient
time. In such a system individuals need to exchange products of their work and owned resources,
or putting it in another way they have to transact with each other. Economic agents use market as
an effective mechanism for organization of their transactions. Importance of the "indivisible hand
of market" for coordination of economic activities has been among fundamentals of the political
economy for more than 200 years. Market prices provide economic agents u,ith powerful
incentives and all relevant information about economy to make efficient use of available resources
maximizing their utilities and profits. Totally decentralized market system gives producers effective
signals about level of demand, consumers preferences, supply of inputs, technological possibilities
etc. Individuals do not need anybody to organize them whether to produce rice or wheat, whether
to be farmers or bankers, whether to buy or rent resources, whether to cultivate their land or to
build golf clubs on it etc. All this is done by market. Market is the ultimate judge and guide of
economic activities. Market serves as a mode for organization of individuals transactions and for
distribution of economic resources among different activities. Moreover the allocation of social
resources that come out as a result of this market coordination (competition) is the most efficient
one. This fundamental achievement of the Neoclassical Economy is a textbook truth which could
be found in any writings in economics.
What has been a new insight in recent development of economic theory is the idea that
"there is costs of using the price mechanism". As Coase formulated it in 1937 "if production is
regulated by price movement, production could be carried out without any organization, well might
we ask: Why is there any organizations?" (Coase 1937, p.19). Would not it be possible all
transactions and coordination between factors of production to be carried out by market? Why are
there organizations for joint production, purchasing inputs, marketing, processing, innovation?
Why do farmers groups, cooperatives, corporations, and contract farming exist in agriculture?
Why are technologically separable stages of business activities linked with each other rather to all
others (market)?
We have met Kuboya Akiya, a farmer from Nakatsubo hamlet of Yachio machi, who is a
member of 20 members machinery group and jointly uses tractor and equipment with other farmers
in the hamlet; he is one of the several thousands members cooperative u'hich supply him with main
inputs; he joined 5 members marketing group, which has got long term contract relationships with
a supermarket. Akiya san practically does not use market too much for organization of his
transactions with other individuals. We have visited a 7 members farm machinery utilization group
in Abashiri area u,hich extends coordination of activities in production process as well on one tenth
of total area (so called common farming section). There are 50000 different kinds of farm groups
in Japanese agriculture and several thousands other types of farm organizations like cooperatives,
land improvement districts, corporations etc. Fundamental question is: why farmers chose to
organize their activities within organizations instead of transacting in the market place.
One possible explanation for existence of organizations in Japanese agriculture could be
that because of tradition, habits etc farmers continue to work jointly. Another interpretation may be
that farmers enjoy community work and they prefer to transect tn organizations without interesting
in market. Third explanation would be that farmers can only work under someone guidance and
they are not good managers. Apparently those are non good explanations of a big variety of
organizations that exist in Japanese agriculture. The opposite is more suitable for agriculture which
has been charuderized as a family rather than a group or corporate business. Hamlet is considered
as a symbol for community life in Japanese rural society. However, all of interviewed farmers in
Nakatsubo hamlet answered that hamlet plays no role as a factor for their farm decision making.
As far as local authority is concerned 787o of requested farmers said that it has no role and rest of
them believe that its role is small in decision making process. In heavily protected Japanese
agriculture only 7Io/o of farmers said that the Government policy has a big role to play as a factor
for their management decision. All requested members of the agricultural cooperative responded
that the cooperative is no factor or a small factor in their decision making. At the same time 677o of
interviewed farmers put a big weight of market prices in the decision making process.
There are many noneconomic reason for evolution and existence of many rural
organizations. Howevet, there must be some economic reason for development of economic
organizations. One such a reason could be that any transaction which is organized in market place
could be also governed within a organization. Sometime it could be cheaper (economical) to
organize a transaction through internal mode rather than in market. If there are costs of using price
system no wonder why individuals set up different organizational and contractual devises to
minimize on transaction costs. Thus in real life the coordination of economic activities of
individuals is done not only by market but through different private organizations set up by
individuals to economize on their exchange.
In fact there is not one but a set of local, regional, national, and international markets.
There are costs to find best prices and partners for farm inputs and outputs. Irvel of costs to
organize a farms transaction through market could be very high for individual farmers. As many as
one third of interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo hamlet pointed out that "existence of too many
dealers" is a problem in input supply transactions.
Second, there are costs to get information about available technologies, machinery and
chemicals quality, consumer preferences, as well as costs for promotion of new products. Third,
there are costs for negotiations, bargaining and sometimes for writing a contract for conditions of
exchange, for time of delivery, products specifications etc. Next, there are costs for monitoring
compliance and enforcing contract terms, and binding costs for secure partners commitment. Fifth,
there are costs for adjustment to consequences during the execution of the contract and for
renegotiations of new conditions of exchange. Next, when dispute arise there are costs for private
or court dispute resolutions. Last, we should include all losses of potential benefits because
effective transactions delay or fail to occur as a result of high information costs or fair from
opportu nistic behavior.
Market is not an unique nor a perfect form for organization of economic transactions.
Sometime is more profitable to coordinate division of labor in an organizationeither through group
decision making or under "visible hand of manager". When some of 28 hired labors of 45 ha
Onodato Shuichi's Agrocorporation in Yachio machi move from one farm plot to another that is
not because relative factors prices have changed. They have been ordered to do so by the manager.
In this case a farmer replaces a set of market transactions for service supply with a new form for
organizalion of previous transactions such as an employment contract. Initially labor are hired from
market and this is connected with costs to look for good workers, negotiations for conditions of
u,ork, wages etc. However, ones this transaction occurs labors agree to follow the orders of
owner (to be directed) during all contracted period. As a result coordination of economic activities
between those agents (contractor in former case and employee in later) is done not by market price
movement but in centralized manner by authority of the manager. Internalizing of transactions
gives to the farmer an opportunity (power) to control transactions more effectively and to increase
his adaptive capacity. It also allows the manager to save repeated costs for finding contractors (or
suppliers), and for negotiations of conditions of exchange, and for renegotiations during execution
stage, and for third part (e.g.court) dispute resolutions etc. Benefit from this nern, way of
transacting takes a form of governance rather than production costs savings.
But we might ask: Why is not then all agricultural production in Japan carried on by one
big company? As Williamson puts it: "Why can not a large firm do everything that a collection of
smaller firms do and more?" (Williamson 1992, p.339). Why are there individual farms and other
organizations with different size in agriculture? Why is family farm the main organization in
agriculture and its size is much smaller than industrial companies? What determines the limits of
farm and farm organizations?
Why for instance, already mentioned 7 mernbers farm group from Abashiri needs two
different organizations for coordination of their activities - one for machinery utilization and second
for common farming. Why have they not extent common farming section Io all27O ha of cultivated
area? Why do they need a common farming section at all? All those farmers are members of
another 30 members group for large machinery use and of a big.agricultural cooperative. Why
those farmers have to participate in so many organizations with different size? Why for instance do
not they use the cooperative to organize all their transactions? Why do Japanese farmers make up
large severai thousands members cooperative but keep small family operations of farm activities?
Answer would be that advantages of internal organization do not come without cost namely
transaction costs for coordination through group decision making or in a hierarchy. First, there are
cost for determine potential of available resources and technologies, and for developing the
efficient plan. Second, there are costs for monitoring implementation of the plan and for preventing
labor shrinking. Next, there are program adjustment costs along with current changes in conditions
for implementation of the p1an. Forth, there are costs for motivation economic agents to provide
information for improvement of plan efficiency. Next, there are costs for aligning conflicts
between different members of organization or levels of hierarchy. I-ast, \ re are to include any
losses of efficiency as a result of communication and incentive disabilities which prevent
achievement of potential for development.
When we asked the leader of the Abashiri farm group "why they do not organize all
operations as common operations" the answer \ /as that this could destroy incentive of individual
farmers: "Now before coming to the group farm office everybody goes to see it own plot. After
merger they would come directly to the office. Now not only coilaboration but also competition
exist between members of the group and this is very important for efficiency". Many of
interviewed farmers in Hokkaido and Ibaraki respond that possibility to use family labor is the
main limit of farm size. Family labor is characterized with very low costs for decision making,
monitoring, directing, preventing of shrinking, dispute resolution etc. Outside of the family
borders coordinating costs of individuals activities in farming arc much bigger through an
organization compare to market. Internal organization has big advantages to control transactions
compare to autonomous market. However, it dose not enjoy high powered and self-enforcing
market incentives. Thus the basic trade off must be between increased control potential and lost
incentives regime of the integral mode.
While natural boundaries of internal organization are determined by technological
imperatives (iike nonseparability, economy of scale and scope), the effective size of integral mode
should depend on its potential to economize both on production and transaction costs. If we look at
historical development in the Eastern European agriculture we can see that otganizalional size went
far beyond the point of positive trade off between technological economies of scale and scope
(production costs), and bureaucratic costs for coordination and motivation (transaction costs).
Market and organization are not opposite but two extreme in the continuum of altemative
govemance modes for transaction. Transacting forms range from spot market, through various
short and long term bilateral and multilateral contractual arrangements, to unified (ownership)
integration. Whether a trirnsaction would be executed across market or whiting an organization
depends on differential transaction costs: a transaction will be carried out from an organization if
the costs are less than to carry the same transaction by market or in other organizations. Hence one
organization becomes bigger if it includes (internalize) additional transaction which previously has
been done by market or another organization. The organization becomes smaller if an intemal
transaction is left to the market or to the another organization. So we can explain all economic
structures in agriculture and distribution of economic activities between different organizational
forms on the base of comparative gfficiency of those transactional modes.
Farmer can organize a transaction, say cultivation of land by tractor, in quite different
ways: he can buy a tractor (unified ownership), he may rent a tractor (rent contract), he can lease a
tractor (interlinked contracts), he could buy cultivation service from market (contract service), a
few farmers may buy a tractor fioint ownership) but they use it individually, farmer can joint the
cooperative which provides cultivation service (non for profit organization), he may rent his land
to a tractor owner and share the output (share tenancy contract), farmer can hire a tractorist to
cultivate his farm (employment contract) and he may sell cultivation service to market (profit
making organization). These altemative forms for transacting have quite different costs and
incentive advantages. Which mode will be chosen depends on costs for carrying this transaction
through those alternative governance forms. That is why '\ /e suppose thatorganrzational design is
comparative and predominantly transaction costs economizing undertaking.
When a transaction is turned in basic unit of the economic. analysis then farm (and farm
organizalions) is a mode for organization of transactions - a nexus of internal zmd outside
transactions. There is not internal transacting in an individual (one person) farm. The level of
outside transactions depends on degree of self-sufficiency of the farm and it could be close to zero
(e.g.traditional agriculture). In a family farm internal transactions are carried between family
members and transaction costs are low. Once a farmer hires a permanent labor then level of internal
transactions increases. Accordingly costs associated with internal transactions get bigger and
decision has to be taken: whether is more economical to hire labor (internal employment contract)
or to buy from market (outside contract). The later also offers different cost minimizing altematives
such as whether to contract service work or to buy finished product. Economic description of farm
organizations that come out is that: this is a devise (mode) for organization of internal and outside
transactions at minimum costs.
Transaction Cost Economics overcomes zero transaction costs assumption of the
Neoclassical economy. It puts the "cots of running the economic system" along production costs
rn hen defining effective boundaries of different governance modes for organization of economic
activities. As Arrow approaches it: "Market failure is not absolute. It is better to consider a broader
category, that of transaction costs which in general impede and in particular cases biock the
formation of markets'r (Arrow 1969, p.46). As specialization and diversification of economic
activity increase then exchange between economic agents become complex. Consequently the costs
for coordination and motivation of activities of specialized agents take increasing part of all social
expenditures. According to some estimated transaction costs reaches up to 450/o of the Gross
National Product of industrialized countries like USA (North 1994, p.360). In order to share the
gain from specialization and to save costs for their exchanges economic agents use appropriate
forms of transacting such as "pick you up" marketing invention or widespread trade with brand
names in Japanese agriculture; they make different private arrangements like contract farming,
strategic alliances, franchises etc; they establish special organizations such as farm groups,
cooperatives, corporations etc. In modern economies complex institutions have been invented to
minimize on transaction costs such as contract enforcement system, quality standards, labeling etc.
Rough idea about evolution of organizational modes for traniacting can b6 get checking chanfes in
labor, land, input supply, service supply, and marketing requisites of the Japanese Agricultural
Census.
Concept of "market failure" has not been a new one in economic theories. Marks made
comprehensive analysis of market imperfections and capitalistic forms of organization. However,
he saw the solution as organizalion of all transactions in a single form - national hierarchy. He also
missed transactional diseconomy from coordination and motivation of activities through
bureaucracy. Traditional lnstitutional Economics describes cases of market failure in order tojustify the Government interventions. However, it misses..zrll variety..of effective private
governance organizations which can substitute market as well as possibility for "government
failure".
When a big dairy farmer hires a veterinarian instead of relying on market for veterinarian
sewices; or when farmers set up an input supply or marketing cooperative instead of using free
market for product procurement; or when a farmer enters in a long term contract with processing
company or retailer; and when an agrofirm opens up a technology division instead of baying
extension service from market, it.means that economic agents replace price system with different
forms of non market organizations of agraian transactions (such as employment contract, joint
venture, strategic aliiance or vertical integration). Thus structure of activities in agrarian area is
defined not only by prices in the free market but also by negotiations between partners and by
bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or from authority in a hierarchy.
Sometime a third part involvement in individual transacting is necessary to make it possible
or more efficient. Very frequently this comes out as a result of a private third part involvement in
transactions. For instance, Hamlet leader in Nakatsubo hamlet mediates renting of farmland from
20 owners to 5 tarmers. Both owners and leasers take advantage of this trilateral form of land
transacting which could not have happened at the same level or same costs of transacting
otherwise. Both sides rely on respect and authority that the Irader of the hamlet has got in this
community.
Third part transaction cost minimizing involvement develops as a market organization as
well. There are for example, numbers of private "whole sale" markets in Kanto area such as one
we visited in Chiokava. In Japanese economy quality standards and grades for farm products serve
as an important part of market institution aiming to make transactions more effective. In many
cases they have been developed by private sector (e.g.whole sale and terminal markets, food
chains, distributors etc) as transacting minimizing devise both for producers and consumers of
farm products.
It is common when effective third part involvement comes up as a result of community
efforts and done by community organizations or by local authority. For instance, registration of
available land for rent was started n 1979 in special Farmland bank in Yachio machi Municipality.
Goal is to assist land owners and farmers to find partners. As a result both sides save costs for
looking for and finding each other. Authority also provides a standard form for contract and
recommends rent level which save costs for negotiating and contract design. Copy of lease contract
is kept in l-and Committee and their content is made public knowledge. This public enforcement
prevent violation of contract terms and save both sides execution costs. In addition local authority
provides incentives to ease land transactions giving subsidy of 20000 yens to owners and farmers
in condition that they sigh lease contract for 6 years. This is a good example for an effective third
part involvement of iocaT authority. Positive result is that there fias been no available land in stock.
Similar organization exists at prefectural level (Kenkusho) and Farmland bank has been set up for
available land for sell. Those who sell or buy through this agency get some tax preferences as
u'e11. The organization mediates land transaction at prefectural or even national level. Considering
scale and involved individuals in this trilateral mode we could conclude that realizine economy of
costs of transacting is quite big.
When ail types of economic organizations in private sector do not work satisfactorily there
is necessary conditions for the Government intervention or third part Govemment involvement in
agraian transactions. Agricultural research and extension, infrastructural development, and farm
credit transactions, all are typical examples for inefficiency of market organization. Those activities
might be caried out as a private organizations. However, the trzrrsaction costs for organizing of
ten and thousands farmers would be very big, it may take a long time to build such an
organization, and most likely this organization would not be very stable because of small
relationship between individuals contribution and benefit (free riding problem). That is why the
Government intervenes in this transactions to make them more cost effective or possible at all. It
is, for instance, when an experimental station is set up to provide free technological development
for farmers or when the Government promotes farmers organizations like cooperatives,
associations to guarantee for agricultural credit, land improvement districts etc.
The biggest problem here is that when market or private sectors seem they work
ineffectively it does not mean that the Government intervention always is more effective. For every
Govemment involvement in agraian transactions benefits must be judged in relation to the costs
(including transacting costs). This cover the general case of public intervention in agrarian sphere
as well as selection of the specific modes for its organization (direct financing or in house
production of public goods, various regulations etc) in comparative transaction costs minimizing
way. For example, presewation of Japanese environment and improvement of countryside is in
big demand now. Apparently market mechanisms would not serve this public demand effectively.
Individuals may develop different kind of private organizations to meet their demand for beautiful
countryside. However, it would be very time consuming and expensive because of little
appropriability and high externalities. Government involvement in this transactions could be more
cost effective. However, there would be very different ways to organize such a trilateral
transaction: Government could introduce some standards for farming and for protection of
environmental resources; Govemment may even prohibit some environmental friendliness
technologies ald to sej up a spe.cial age.ngy to enforce this measure; Government could establish its
own companies, and preserving and improvement of environment would be its main duty;
Government may promote projects and give subsidy, tax preferences etc for farmers which are
involved in such environmentally sound activities; Government might provide direct payment to
farmers to do the job of protection and improvement of countryside; Government could give price
support or can be engaged in marketing of farm products in order to keep farming going on, and
ultimately preserving environment. Apparently those different modes to govern this transaction
would have quite different costs for Japanese taxpayers.
Thus in the market based economy individual agents need and develop non market forms
for organuation of their transactions, and real economy consists of many coordinating subsectors.
Given competitive setting the tendency will be to adapt those organizational modes that best
economize on transaction costs. It means that there is not a singe form for organization of all kinds
and types of agrarian transactions nor universal governance modes exist forever. Economic agents
will chose and improve forms for organization of their transactions along with development of
technology and changing conditions of exchange (e.g.improvement of contract enforcement
system, development of communication technologies etc). Governance modes will emerge and
evolve as long as any transaction economizing potential exists, and they eventually die when more
effective forms for organization occur. In the long run the most transaction costs minimizing
organization for each particular transaction will prevail (efficiency principle). Ultimately available
for individuals continuum of altemative modes for agrarian transactions find its base in dominant
legal system. For instance, if restrictions on land ownership and land lease exist then small scale
farming and part time farming will developed as main form for organization in agriculture; or if ban
on use of share tenancy exists then fix rent tenancy would develop as a single although not the
most efficient form for organization of land transactions; when direct private marketing of rice is
prohibited then a big black (illegal) market develop as substitute etc.
So far we have examined the Current Transaction Economics of economic activities in
agriculture. Besides that each society has to bear the Long term transaction costs for setting up one
or another organizalional form. Those are high level of preliminary entrepreneurial costs in private
sector and political entrepreneurship costs for public goods supply or institutional development.
They are different from Current transaction costs for using aitemative modes and thus long term
investments which are to return from transaction economizing potential of the new forms. lrt us
suppose that a transaction requires high level of specific investment but it is occasional. Trade with
intellectual agrarian products (e.g.patent) can be included in this class of transactions. Market
mediation is not effective because of little appropriability, divisibility, measurability and high
uncertainty of innovation activity. Set up costs for special bilateral private structure for secure
effective transacting may not be covered for each occasion. Consequently parties would not invest
in transacting specific assets and this transaction would fail to occur. Hence, a third part
involvement (e.g.assistance, arbitration, enforcement etc) is needed for effective organization of
such transactions. In this case the Governments role in new property rights development and
enforcement would be crucial.
There are two types set up transaction costs: for establishing "institution of governance like
firms, hybrids, bureaus" and for changing "institutional environment of which property rights are
part". Factors and mechanism for "induced" institutional innovation in agrarian area have been well
developed in the Public Choice literature. For instance a brilliant model of the Rice policy in Japan
has been presented by Hayami (Hayami 1988, p.l3Z). Moreover efficiency of mobilizing of
factors for institutional modemization depends on tradition, cultural endowments etc and they are
quite specific for each country. Some of the challenges for Japanese farm organizations during
transforming from "property dominated to corporation dominated society" are profoundly
elaborated by Tsuboi (Tsuboi I99I, p.66). Here an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to
study out complex of factors. responsible for one or another. organizational developmTt. In this
sense microeconomic analysis which is broadly employed by the Transaction Cost Economics
could contribute substantially to understanding forces of institutional innovations.
In any case transaction costs during periods of transformation of society and associated with
development of institutional environment (liberalizing markets, introducing new property rights,
rights on contracting etc) must be much higher than in periods of stable institutions development.
Public preferences at any stage of development and admissible social costs of institutional
modemization are quite specific for each society. They are very important economic parameters but
they come to the economic system outside - from political system of society. Economic analysis
could less contribute in defining those levels since this is the area of the political decision making.
Essential economists role would be to evaluate altemative ways and to chose the most effective
(transacting minimizing) modes for getting to the social goals.
New institutions come out as a result of private entrepreneurialships, and negotiations, and
associations. Therefore individuals must not be restricted to develop their private organuations for
minimizing costs of transacting. Moreover economic agents must have political freedom to develop
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otganizations and associations to promote public goods supply and demand for fundamental
institutional changes. Effective economic development can not be sustained without democracy in
economy, which means free market and freedom for choosing private modes for transacting. But
we can not expect to have real economic democracy without having democracy in political area (we
refer to.relationships betweenpolitical and economic systems of society which has been discussed
in previous paragraph). The later means freedom to express economic interests and lobbing for
public good supply and institutional modernization. In this light we have to see the fundamental
changes in institutional framework of Eastern Europe and to estimate their potential for increasing
efficiency of agrarian transactions. This is especially important when u,e have to compare current
results from reforms in those countries with economic reforms in some Asian countries (e.g.
China, Vietnam) which have being going on without fundamental changes in political structures.
Effective Boundaries of Farm and Farm Organizations
What determines the boundaries of farm organizations and what determines the boundaries
of agrarian markets? This old question has not get a good answer in the Traditional Economics. In
the Neoclassical Economics the boundaries of the firm are determined by technology and firm is
presented as a production function. In this model using of the markets and firms is free for
individuals. However, real life economy is not so smooth and easy to describe as it is in
textbooks.
Why for instance 10 ha technologically optimal size of rice farming in Japan has not been
reached? Why would not the effective farm size be say 100 ha but it must be determined by
technology? Even in labor intensive vegetable production we can observe cases fot effective big
size operations. Prospective form in this respect is cited 45 ha Agrocorporation in Yachio machi.
No doubt that production technology is an important factor for organizational development.
Minimal size of farm operation is to be found in technological parameter such as technological
nonseparability of activities. In Japanese dispersed paddy agriculture for instance, water supply
could not have been conducted by individual farmers since interdependency (nonseparability) of
water use. That is why since the earliest period water use organizations have been developed as
public projects (Mori 1997, p.5). Besides this exception it is almost impossible to give examples in
fznming activities where organization form is determined unilaterally by technology. Usually there
are plenty of altemative modes for organization of agraian transactions under the same
technology. One extreme is when farmers are engaged only in farm management and contract all
farm activities from market. This is not a hypothetical case. Great part of rice part time farmers are
not involved in farm operation at all but they rely heavily on contract services. For full time
farmers separation of management functions from production (technological) activities is even
more defined. The owner of already mentioned Agrocorporation in Yachio machi spends 757o of
his time on management activities besides 507o of total time distribution in on strategic
management. He also has employed two division managers to assist him in overall management of
the farm. Our investigation shows that management compises 3870 of total time of the real farmers
in Nakatsubo hamlet. Detachment of management functions has been an important characteristic of
farm groups development in Japan. According to a survey leaders of farm groups intend to change
their present management status to a long term basis and a full time employment (Ito 1991, p.47).
Another technological parameter which could determine the farm size farm is economy of
scale. In order to use the capacity of a large combine for instance a farmer increases size of
operations. However, the development of the technology usually follows demand and in fact it is
changeable parameter as well. Otherwise it is very difficult to explain widespread existence of
small scale machinery in Japanese agriculture. Moreover maximum economy of scale can be
reached not through internalizing the activity but by market through buying (or selling) the product
or service of specialized activity. Farmers can geI resources or services cheaper through market
procurement as they do for post service, renting cars, inputs supply etc. Why farmers do not buy
machinery services or rent farm equipment but prefer to set up own organization for machinery
services? Even if ownership is the best option why specialized farm organizations do not grow up
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to the national scale where economy of scale would be totally explored?
Third technological factor is economy of scope. Farmers have to produce two or more
products under different technology in order to use temporarily free resources (e.g.paddy field
after harvesting of rice). Indeed in farming this could be very important especially as far as
effective use of family labor throughout the year is concemed. However, free resources couid be
trade more effectively in the market place instead of using them in nonspecialized activities(opportunity costs reason). As a matter of fact modern farming is chaiacterized not with
diversification of production but with high product and technology specialization. Again we have
no answers why farm managerc do not buy or rent more resources to increase farm operations.
Why do farming continue to be a family business in contrast to incredible concentration of
resources in al1 other industries?
Technology and its development is very important for determine the effective size of farm
organization. That is particularly important in transaction cost minimizing respect. For instance, the
mechanization of farm operations saves on transaction costs and allows to increase farm size in
three ways: first, farmer needs less hired labor and can supervise them effectively in large
operational scale. Second, mechanization is connected with standardization of farm operations. It
means that manager capacity to monitor more hired labor at large scaie increase. Third, farmer
ability to_ control farm operations extend. Consequently he can get cheaper and in bigger quantity
standardized service through outside (market) contracts.
Technology development in information and communication systems revolutionaries
organizations for agraian transactions as well. Costs for finding prices for farm inputs and outputs
in different markets become very low and available "on line" for farmers. This increases
transaction cost minimizing potential for direct market procurement of farm inputs and products.
Recent bum in catalog sales of farm products through post office system in Japan is a good
example for effective organization of marketing through direct transaction between producers and
final consumers. Kobayashi san, apple and jus producer from Nagano has got 40000 clients using
post office and local NTT computer network system. Most recent introduction of Internet for
marketing of farm products in Japan practically connects directly all producers with final
consumers. This organtzation of transactions is close to the ideal market since it practically makes
transacting costs for marketing close to zero. Most likely this new means of communication will
change substantially structures for organization of agraian transaction in near future.
Framer is not only a part of technology or a factor in production function. Individuals are
the basic economic units and centers of economic transactions. As a good manager farmer is
interested not only how to use technology with minimal production costs but how to transact with
other individuals in the most economical ways. Actualiy the farmer as a manager of agraian
transactions is the real object of our analysis. Few economics can be found in traditional self-
sufficient agriculture where little specialization irnd exchange take place. lrvel of transactions
intensity and costs of transacting is negligible. When specialization increases then exchanges
(transacting) and costs associated with them get bigger. In order to find out good answers of all
questions about the modern farm organizations we should leave "black box" textbooks approach
and look at real life. In real agraian economy farm, and farm organizations, and market are only
altemative modes for governing of farm transactions. For farm managerc agrarian economy is not
only production cost economy but a transaction cost economy as well. Therefore we should follow
the practical business sense of farmers if we intend to develop good models for farm economy.
Under certain circumstances market prices provide individuals with all relevant information
about economy and powerful incentives to use available resources effectively while maximizing
theirprofit (Milgrom and Robertsl992,p.58).Free market is aperfect mode for organization of
agraian transactions when neither sellers nor buyers can affect prices (agents are price takers and
they lack bargaining power); when barriers to exit or entry in different activities are low (no
monopoly exists); when information is fully available in the same degree for all partners (lack of
information asymmetry and possibility for opportunism); when products are homogeneous or
standardized (minimum costs for finding partners, negotiating, exchange and contract
enforcement), when no externality exists (parties bear all costs and benefits associated with their
choices). In such a market costs of transacting are very low, initial assignment of property rights
does not matter and economic agents trade property rights on resources up to the pattem of their
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effective Neoclassical equilibrium (so called "Coase theorem" based on Coase 1960). Therefore
any society needs market as the most effective or altemative form for organization of some part of
economic transactions.
Since a great part of agricultural inputs are highly standardized for a big number of users,
and technological changes in farming are slow, and most of farm products have mass
"commodity" character, market is the most effective way to organize a large share of agraian
transactions. We say that agtaian factors and output markets work well. Here we feel very
comfortable in the Neoclassical framework. In this imaginative world of zero transaction costs
there is no need for any farm organizations.
However, totally decentralized market system of decision making can not organize all
transactions in agriculture. Here we enter more dapper waters of the positive transaction costs
agraian economy. First, product and technology differentiation makes it expensive for individual
farmers to check all relevant market information about inputs quality, conditions for use, best input
and output prices etc. In order to save information and operationzrl costs of transacting farmers set
up input supply or marketing coops.
Second, farmers may experience small
upstream and downstream industries. So they
negotiation and bargaining costs of transacting.
Third, farmers may face missing markets for some products or services - e.g.bank service
in rural area, machinery and computer service for farming etc. That is u'hy farmers have to develop
this activities as internal or joint non for profit operations.
Next, farmers face risk from price fluctuation of agricultural products. They may set up a
coop to pool the risk or they could share the risk with processing industry on the base of long term
contracts, vertical integration etc. Farmers can also develop organization for political lobbing and
eventually to use tax payers money for price support of farm products. Sometimes benefits from
lobbing could be so big compare to costs for political organizing that for a long period of time great
public resources would be redistributed in farmers favor.
Fifth, when a transaction is associated with externality (e.g.small appropriability of
intellectual agraian products) no market can organize such a transaction effectively. Farmers are to
develop organuation for public goods demand and for a third party (community, I-ocal authority,
Government) involvement in agraian transactions.
Sixth, because of information asymmetry a farmer can be exposed to opportunistic
behavior before or during execution of transaction (e.g.difficulties in verification of inputs quality,
labor shrinking, partners refusal to buy perishable product at harvest time, lack of pay off). So he
would prefer to rely on some stable form for organization of transaction like brand name or
guarantee in the former case, output based contract or share tenancy in the second case, long term
contract or joint investment in the third case, and advance payment in later case.
Seventh, if a farmer makes transaction specific investment he may either lose their value (if
transaction does not occur) or he may face unfavorable trading condition when the transacting
recurrent time comes. There are plenty of examples in farm production specialized (prior
hawesting) for particular end use,or for low voiume niche markets like: organic farming or brand
name products, production of farm products under special technology for processing industries
etc. When farmers investments are "lock up" with particular transaction then open market exchange
is usually displaced by some form of.contract or ownership integratipn (e.g.contra^ct farming,
processing or consumem cooperatives). Such tight bilateral coordination between farmers and
processors or distributors exist also for perishable products (milk, fresh vegetable and fruits,
animals for slathering) where assets are in high bilateral dependency and quantity, quality and time
of delivery are extremeiy important both for farmers and clients. In input supply side such high
asset specificity is usually insured by long term contracts, common ownership (open membership
cooperative), joint ownership (close membership cooperatives) or even unified organization. In
later case we would expect that farmers own rather rent all farm specific assets and it is not likely
to develop orchard or build a green house on rented land.
Transaction costs depend on the nature of transaction and on the mode of it.s organization.
It is not possible to measure transaction costs directly but we do not have to. We are interested not
in their absolute level but in relative costs of transacting through different modes.
numbers bargaining conditions (or monopoly) in
may organize bargaining cooperative to save on
T2
Opperationalisation of the Transaction Cost Economics has been done namely defining the
microeconomic factors responsible for transacting costs differences among variety of
organizational forms. In order to determine effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of
altemative governance modes for organization of agranan transactions we are to match attributes of
transactions (which differ for each transaction) with governance structures (which transaction costs
minimizing capacity differ) in discriminating way. In this way we will have defined the matrix of
effective governance modes for different transactions, and we will get criteria to determine the
effective boundaries of farm organizations.
There are two behavioral assumption about economic agents that the transaction cost
economizing is based on: bounded rationality and opportunism. The first is cognitive assumptions
according which human agents are assumed to be "intendedly rational" but they experience "limits
in formulating and solving complex problems, and in processing information" (Simon 1957,
p.198). Real "organizational" man is less calculative than traditional "economic" man. Economic
ramifications of this assumption are that practically all forms for contracting of complex
transactions are incomplete.
The second assumption is that economic agents are given to opportunism as a "deep
condition of self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson 1985, p.30). This means that transacting
counterparts are less thrust worthy and not reliable in actions. Accordingly if there is an
opportunity for one of transacting sides to get extra rent from exchange he will do so.
Those two behavioral assumptions have been broadly used in the Agency literature to
znalyze (inter) orgarizational failure. Williamson puts them as a base for solving.the problem of
any economic organization: "assess altemative governance structure in term of their capacity to
economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding transactions against
opportunism" (\Milliamson 1985, p.42).
Bounded rationality and possibility for opportunism are not important when
frequency rn ith which transactions recur is small, when there is no big uncertainty associated with
transactions, and when a transaction is not supported by transaction specific investments. In this
case transaction costs are negligible and price (market) mediation is the most effective mode for
organizalion of transactions. However, when bounded rationality and opportunism coincide with
frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity of the transactions then autonomous market exchange
gives way to more complex forms of contracting or internal organization. That is why Williamson
identifies asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency as "principle dimensions with respect to
which transactions differ and among them the first is the most important" (Williamson 1985,
p.s2).
When frequency of transactions between same parties is low, uncertainty of transacting is
not big and neither sides invest in transaction specific capital there is no need for a special private
organization. Coordination of transactions is effectively done by market and a farmer buys for
instance, necessary long tern inputs (tractor, equipment) from a specialized shop. Bounded
rationality is easily overcome since uncertainty is low. Parties restrain from opportunism since
market competition does not tolerate bad reputation. Since low specificity of assets to bilateral
transacting either of partners can lurn at any moment to competitors. Spot market transactions or
classical contracts are main modes for carrying out transacting.
When frequency of transacting is high, and uncertainty and asset specificity are low then
market mode is again a cheap one. That is for instance when a farmer.buys regularity gasoline
from closest station or regularly left on trust some farm operations to his neighbor. However,
because of the high frequency of transactions between same partners both sides are interested to
continue their relationships. l,ong term transacting develop confidence between parties and they
have incentives to design modes to save on repeated costs of transactions. Besides since
uncertainty is krw it is not costs consuming to develop such mechanisms. Very frequently such
transactions are govern by good will of partners rather than of some formal modes. For instance
instead of renting a land plot after each crop unlimited lease form is used. Because of low
uncertainty and lack of asset specificity partners restrain from opportunism. Unhappy partner can
easily turn to another supplier or buyer since his assets are not specific. Bounded rationality is not
important since uncertainty is low. However, no special interest to develop some complex mode to
govem this transactions since market enforced relationships effectively.
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When frequency is low but uncertainty is high and no transacting specific investments are
involved then again market mode is the most effective. Since recurrence of transaction befiryeen
same parties in low they have not specific interest to develop a special mode to govern transactions
and overcome uncertainty. High investments in transacting with particular partner are not made and
transacting could take place on market (anonymous partner). Opportunism is possible because of
incidental character of transaction and repeating of the transacting with same partner does not
matter. Because of high uncertainty bounded rationality is crucial, and it is costly to elaborate and
enforced conditions of transacting. It is important to build some mode to avoid opportunism but it
would be expensive to design such a mode for rare transacting in high uncertainty. However,
affecting size can change partner any time without big loses since only universal capital support
transactions. Depending on the level of uncertainty which surrounds transactions farmers take
different business risk and get normal, 1ow or extra than average rate of return from market
transacting.Wholesale marketing of farm products is a typical example for this kind of
transactions.
When frequency is high and uncertainty is high but transactions are not supported by
specific capital then partners are interested to continue transacting and to develop modes to deal
u,ith high uncertainty. When for instance a farmer signs a year long contract u,ith a supermarket
with fix prices he avoids uncertainty of price fluctuation. For the supermarket this mode guaranties
stable supply of farm products without depending on changes in market supply and prices.
Besides both parties have incentive to overcome emerging difficulties associated with uncertainty
in mutual interests since high recurrence of transacting. That is rn'hy despite of the high uncertainty
bounded rationality does not matter and no opportunism develop. Because of the law asset
specificity a special mode is not even necessary and transacting problems are govern by the good
will of long term partners. For instance such a character of transacting have many employment
contracts in farming. Since transactions are frequent but uncertainty is high a farmer hires a
permanent labor to save on repeated costs for service supply or daily labor. Because of the high
uncertainty duties usually are not specified. Since both sides invest no transacting specific capital
there is not a need for a sighed contract and term is not limited. Also various organizations develop
to share risk of uncertainty on the base of high frequency of transactions like poling cooperatives
for instance.
However big transaction difficulties arise when bounded rationality and possibility for
opportunistic behavior are combined with high level of transaction specific investments. When big
investments to support transactions with a particular partner have to be made then coordination of
exchange hardly would be through market mode. Specific investments are locked in a particular
transaction and they can not be transferred to altemative use or users without big losses in value.
Here bounded rationality and possible opportunistic behavior matter since high investment could
be lost if transaction does not occur or conditions of exchange are unfavorably renegotiated during
execution stage. If there is unilateral dependency of assets of same of the partners such transaction
would not occur if measures are not taken to safeguard against possible opportunism. Therefore, a
special private mode is necessary to govern such transactions and to safeguard against possible
failure. It is not likely for instance, a private road to remote farmers plot to be build by market
investors. If farmer rejects to buy the road or to lease it out, or stop paying toll fee then specific
investments in this transacting will be lost. Since investments are in a high unilateral dependency
from exploitation of the farm plot the only mode to govem transactions supported by them is
through internal ownership (or joint ownership) mode or a long term lease. In the same way since
farmers are heavily dependant from water supply transactions water supply facilities are usually
organized by ownership mode or a strict third part regulations of water use is necessary in order to
carry such transactions smoothly.
When asset specificity of transaction is high but frequency and uncertainty of transaction
are low dependant party is interested to develop a special mode to guarantee his investment in
transacting specific capital. Since uncertainty is low it is not difficult to write ernd enforced a
detailed contract for conditions of transaction in order to prevent opportunism. Since recurrence of
transaction is low neither party would made transaction specific investment if this investments can
not be returned during contracted period. Transaction would occur only if assets of both sides are
in high interdependency for a long period of time and long term contract will be developed to
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govern those transactions. If unilateral dependency of assets specificity exists then either a long
term contract (if it is not costly to elaborate terms of transacting) or internal mode of organization
would be possible.
When chances to repeat a transaction are rare, uncertainty associated with transacting is
high, and asset specificity for transacting with a particular partner is high then serious transaction
difficulties occurs. Here bounded rationality coincide with high uncertainty and this prevent
possibility to write complete contract for conditions of transactions. Possibility from opportunism
is high and effective punishment is low since transactions are accidental and uncertainty is big.
Costs of termination of the contract is very high for a partner with high specific investment
involved. Besides low recurrence would block such transacting if effective lifespan of investment
is longer than the transacting period. Since it is difficult to find altemative partner to return on
highly specific investments the only \ /ay to carry out such transaction is through internal mode. If
assets of both sides are in high transaction interdependency than a special private mode would have
a high value for them to overcome transacting difficulties. However, because of the high
uncertainty, costs for designing of such a transacting mode would be very high. Since possibility
for recurrence of transactions between same parties is lou, set up costs for a special mode of
transacting would not be recovered by occasional transactions. Either a third part assistance or
internal rmde come up to organue such transactions. For instance investments in agricultural
research in development are highly transacting specific, uncertainty to get positive results is big,
horn'ever frequency of transacting for individual farmers is not high. If a third part is not involved
then private partners would not invests in such activities and technological supply transactions
would fail to occurs at effective scale.
When assets specificity is high, and frequency of transacting between same parties is also
high and uncertainty is low then both parties are interested to continue their relationships.
Transactions can not be organized by autonomous market since specific investment are required. If
assets of both parties are in high bilateral dependency a long term contract mode comes up as a
form of transacting. Designing of such a special mode for organization is not difficult since
uncertainty is low. Also efforts to develop such private mode for standardization of transactions
(incentive structure, adjustment mechanisms, conflict resolution devices etc) are justified and costs
can be returned by transaction minimizing potential of new forms. If there is unilateral dependency
in assets either detailed contract form or internal (ownership or joint ownership) organization of
transacting are a solution. Bargaining and service supply cooperatives are good examples in this
respect.
When high assets specificity coincides with high frequency and uncertainty of transactions
then the ownership (internal) mode is the most likely solution. Since uncertainty of exchange is
high it u'ould be very difficult (expensive) to elaborate all possible consequences and
coiresponding obligations for partners in a contract form. Intemal mode has big control and
adaptive advantages comparing to other forms of transacting. Transaction can not be govern
through market modes since special investments are necessary. Because of high uncertainty
poteniial for nonmarket based rent seeking from a transaction is high during contract writing and
contract execution stages (contractual asymmetry). Frequent recurrence of transacting increases the
potential of internal mode of organization. If assets are in unilateral dependency possibility for
bpportunistic behavior is high when recurrent transaction time is shorter than life span of the assets
(Fundamental process transformation). Therefore, internal organization like an inputs supply
cooperative is more likely to govern transactions then contract mode. When assets are in high
interdependency then both parties are interested to develop effective forms to overcome uncertainty
of tran.sacting and to benefit from frequent transactions. In modern agtat''tn economy rational
contract has been invented to serve this purpose. Since detailed specification of conditions of
transacting is not possible in high uncertainty parties negotiate only policy of their relationship and
mutual expectation. For instance instead of fixing prices of farm products only formula for their
calculation is negotiated in a contract with processing company.
Therefore, assets specificity is the most fundamental dimension of transaction and different
nonmarket modes are to be developed to organize transacting supported by specific investments.
This is because the value of transaction specific assets is much smaller than its value under
altemative use. It is not possible to change use or users of specific capital without loosing great
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part of its value. Degree of assets specificity measured by costs for redeployment of locked in
investments can be considered as opportunity costs of the transacting costs. It expresses what a
party pays (loses) for organization of altemative transactions if initial transaction does not occur, it
is terminated or conditions of exchange are unfavorably renegotiated. Intemal organization comes
at cost but it has big investment protecting advantages over market contracting thus transaction
costs minimizing potential. That is why internal governance (ownership) is always the mode to
organize firm's "core" assets and special purpose technology. As assets universality increases then
continuing transacting with a particular partner becomes less valuable. Those transactions are more
effectively organized through bilateral contracting (medium asset specificity) or by market (general
pulpose assets).
Asset specificity is not a technological but a transaction characteristic of the farm
organization. It shows whether a farmer depends on particular supplier of buyer, and whether this
transacting dependency is supported by big investment. In variety of situations the same assets
could be with very different level of specificity. For instance, paddy field could be an asset with
high specificity to the farm if production resources and rice marketing are strongly regulated by the
Government. But it could be with low asset specificity if there is free movement of agrarian
resources and liberalized market for rice. In both cases the transacting value of paddy field would
be very different for farmers. That is why transaction cost minimizing is a microeconomic
undertaking and requires studies of the context (micro factors) of transacting in each
circumstances.
Large part of agranan inputs, assets, and outputs are not farm (transaction) specific, and
farm gate market transactions are dominant. Besides long term informal and interlinked personal
relationships are common in rural community. Recurrent long time transactions prevail between
partners as trust and reputation have a big role to play in minimizing cost of transacting. All of
intewiewed farmers in Nakatsubo hamlet indicate that they always use the same partners for inputs
supply zmd marketing transactions. Almost 5770 of transactions are reported to be interlinked. In
many cases farmers business relationships with partners have been continuing for several
generations.
At the same time natural uncertainty is high in agriculture, technology is very flexible and
productivity varies according to specific micro environment conditions. Output level is very
sensitive to quality effort and depends on precision of critical farm operations. Thus human asset
could be strong farm specific.
There have been two main concerns for Kojiura san, the manager of the one of the biggest
dairy farm in Hokkaido: possibility for technical failure and environmental problem. No wonder
that he has got as full time employers a mechanic and an university graduate. In addition he has
build a small veterinarian clinic and appointed a veterinarian in the farm. Manager may get
veterinary service and machinery maintenance service and technology development from the
market. However, dependance of his big farm operations from the skills of those persons is very
high. Due supply of those services are critical for output level. Permanent employment contract
(intemalization of transactions) allows the manager to control directiy those transactions avoiding
risk from market procurement.
In dairy production knowledge of the state and behavior of individual animals is ffitical for
efficiency. This knowledge and experience turn to an asset with high specificity to the farm. For
labor his farm specific skill is also asset with high specificity since he can get higher return on it
(wage rate for permanent labor usually is higher than for daily based labor). That is why most of
dairy operations are organized as internal transactions and done by family members or permanent
employees. The opposite is truth in highly standardized rice cultivation. Here knowledge of
technology is not farm specific but an universal asset. That is why a big part of operations can be
contracted (ieft on trust) and only few critical operations (like'*,ater control) executed by farmers.
In agriculture the managers ability to control hired labor is usually limited, and monitoring
and enforcement costs could be quite high. Very frequently because of the big natural uncertainty it
is difficult to verify relationships between labor perfonnance and output level. Transacting costs
for supervision of labor and for measurement of work (or contracted) results could be very high
even for an experienced farm manager. That is why extension of farm size is heavily restricted
from the dependance of critical farm operations from hired labor or contract services. Besides
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managerial ability differ among various farmers (good managers, bad managers). Even tf agraian
service and factors and output markets are well developed there would be different costs for
farmers to use those markets. That is why we can expect that farm size and scope of market
transactions will be gradually adjusted along with leaming by doing experience of farmers.
Potential of economy of scale and scope from general technology is not big in agriculture.
This potential is easily achieved if internal organization does not experience high transaction costs
or any institutional restrictions exist. There is no incentive to extend farm operations through
horizontal integration with competitors (group farming, production cooperatives, agrocorporation)
because trade off between team work gains and internal costs of organtzation has a very low
margin. It is only possible where horizontai coordination costs (for decision making, measurement
of performance, avoiding free riding etc) are low as in homogeneous and less labor intensive
productions. Hence boundaries of horizontal integration is determined by the potential to achieve
scale (scope) economy through common management and use of resources (e.g.pastures, large
machinery etc) versus organizational costs.
Risk from market price fluctuation (economic uncertainty) or monopoly couid be shared via
specially designed organization with competitors (specialized or pooling cooperatives, buffer
stocks, associations of cooperatives) or with upstream and downstream partners (contracts, quasi
or complete integration). In such conditions effective horizontal boundaries of agrofirm (farm) is
determined by technological opportunity to achieve scale economy (single product) and scope
economies (by products), farmers personal abilities to supervise hired labor, technical opportunity
to use self enforcing contracts (output based compensation, share tenancy), and possibility to use
low transaction costs (e.g.family) labor for core farm operations. Data shows that world-wide
owner-cultivation has been the most common form of land tenure comprising about 80 percent of
all farms covered by World Census (Hayami and Otsuka 1993, p.7).
When assets specificity is relatively high to particular transaction in vertical chain (strong
dependance from particular supplier or buyer) and behavioral uncertainty is high, then a farmer
rarely relies on open market for transacting. Those transactions are safeguarded either through
farm ownership on transaction specific assets (e.g.dairy cows and milking facilities) or throughjoint ownership (shareholding, cooperation in processing or storage facilities), or through tight
modes for vertical coordination (stakeholding alliances, supply and delivery contracts), or even
unified integration in industry (e.g.poultry and swan production, cattle feeding). Vertical
integration is attained at farm level for highly specific assets (make or buy decision), or through
common or joint ownership outside farm borders (cooperation economy on highly specific assets),
as well as through joint ownership or tied-up contracts with upstream or dorn nstream partners. In
each cases there must be some potential surplus from bilateral (or multilateral) exchange and it is to
be shared by each partner through integration of transactions.
Vertical integration at farm level depends on managerial possibility to reach economy of
scale for more than one specialized activity (diversification of farming, developing of marketing
and processing operations) and it faces limits of managerial diseconomy. Otherwise farmer either
builds inefficient facilities and lose on production costs competition (upward side) or makes
efficient investment but has to bear risk to buy from (or sell to) competitors (downward side).
Moreover when assets deoendency is negligible integration into related stages incurs only
additional costs without any extra benefits. It is well known that low transaction specific
investment's risk is more effectively managed not through diversification of production (vertical
integration) but at capital market through extending assets portfolio.
Transaction cost economizing approach to vertical integration outside farm gates gives a
new look at effective boundaries of farm cooperatives. Cooperative is a form for unified
(ownership) organization of transactions with high assets specificity for members. We visited a
very modern Fruit Selecting Center of Inan Agricultural Cooperative in Nagano. Selection of fruits
is done by sophisticated equipment and every fruit is tested for sweetness, color, rape etc by
electronic sensor. Efficiency of marketing increases since this technology allows to give 700%
quality guarantee and meet high consumers demand in this respect. However, the investment of
2.4 billion yens is highly transaction specific for 890 fruit producers from the region. Such a
substantial, long term, and highly dependant from limited numbers of farmers investment u,ould
not have been done as a market oriented business activity. There is big uncertainty about level of
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transactions during effective life of the investments. Dependance of exploration of the capacity of
the Center and return on investment highly depends on fruit producers demand in the area. On the
other hand possibility of opportunism or even termination of transactions is very high. For
instance, farmers may refuse to use this expensive (comprised 23 yen per kilo selected fruit)
service and start to apply traditional technic for selection. This high unilateral dependency of
transaction stops outsiders to invested in such highly (transacting) specific assets. Since farmers
hardly would get such a service from the market (or effectively turn to another supplier) asset
dependency on this transaction takes a high bilateral character. As a result the integral mode such
as joint ownership (cooperative) develops as an effective form for organization of those
transactions with strong bilateral interdependency.
High asset specificity can explain why market vaiue of cooperative assets is much lou.er
that its value for farmers (cooperative is member oriented). Economic ramifications are that
members are ready to accept much lower than market rate of return on their cooperative shares. As
our survey shows many Japanese farmers do not even know what their cooperative shares are. In
many cases cooperatives accumulates at least a part of dividends and members practically get much
lower cash retum on investment. We have not found examples for redemption policy (current
revolvement of equity to members) in any of visited cooperatives in Hokkaido, Nagano and
Ibaraki. Cooperative can be considered as a typical example for organization of transactions
supported by high asset specificity where opportunity for economy of scale (scope) can not be
explored by individual farmers. That is why joint ownership mode is the most efficient for
organization of these farm transactions.
However, cooperative form faces memberships limit to get efficient scale or scope
economies, as well as managerial diseconomy. Those shortcomings are only partly compensated
by specialization and association of cooperatives. Another challenge is toward market orientation
of cooperative and turning it in a profit making organization. Our suryey shou,s that namely
increase of membership and reduction of non profit making activities are the most important issues
on current agenda of cooperative management in Japan. However, market (profit) orientation is
connected with well known disadvantages that cooperation posses as a form for business
organization such as: conflict with members, low efficiency of group decision making, life cycle
problem, investing limits, legislative restrictions etc (Sexton and Iskou' L99l). On the other hand
high degree of outside (market) transactions means that cooperative assets become more
transacting universal (therefore less members oriented). In this case no more economic reason for
internal integration since market coordination of vertical transactions is more effective than any
integral mode.
Governance matrix for organization of different input supply and marketing transactions in
agriculture have been summarized in Table 1. Most effective contracting and otganizational modes
differ according to type of transacting, and depend on combination of assets specificity,
uncertainty and frequency of transacting. When there is no asset dependency, uncertainty is lou,
and frequency is high then market is the best mode for organization of transactions. However,
when agraian transactions are charactenzed by high asset specificity, big uncertainty and less
recurence then an internal organuations based on ownership or tight integration comes up to be
the most effective ways of transacting. In some cases private agraian transactions fail to occur at
effective scale and then strong necessity for third path involvements in agrarian transactions comes
to agenda. Development of farming system would be substantially deformed if the effective modes



















I-and supply O O,LL LL,O LL FRC,JO SRC,JO M,FRC M,SRC
l,abor supply F F,P F P,OBC TBC,F TBC,P TBC,OBC M
Input supply O JO,VI JO JO JO VI,JO C,M M
Servicesupply O JO O JO JO Rm
Capital supply O JO,VI JO TPI,JO JO,TPI C,TPI M MMarketing JO JO,VI JO,C C,VI JO.TPI VI.TPI M M
Table 1 Alternative Modes for Organization of Agrarian Transactions
M - market, O - ownetship, JO - joint ownership, W - vertical integration, TPI - third part
involvement, F - family labor, P - partnership, TBC - time based contraCt, OBC - output based
contract, C - classical contract, RC - rational contract, LL - long lease, FRC - fix renf contract,
SRC - share rent contract
Organization of Agrarian Transactions in Yachio Machi
Agriculture and agrarian transactions have always taken an important part of Yachio machi
economy. Number of individuals which have been involved in some kind of direct agtarran
transactions is quite big. According to the Census more than 50% of households are farm
households and 597o of population is farm population in 1990. There are 2734 farms rn'ith family
farmers averaging 2.53. Those figures give us ideafor number of basic units for organization of
farm transactions (farms) as well as for the size of internal transacting through this mode.
Both number of participants in agricultural transacting and character of these participation
have changed dramatically for last 35 years. Since 1960 number of farms has declined more than
2070. Share of full some farms accounting almost 7070 of farms in 1960 reduced to 17% of total
farms n 1994. At the same time "part time farms II" 2 comprising l37o of farms in 1960 increased
upto 637o :r;r1994. Only for the.period 1975-1990 farmers per farm dropped 377o.Morc than a
half of farmers were engage in farming more than 150 days in I97 5 . While this share dropped off
with 15 points in 1990, the share of farmers involved less than 29 days in farming increased up to
one third of total. Thus fundamental changes in structure of transactions have been in place and
importance of agrarian transactions in all economic activities has been decreasing.
However, intensity of agrarian transaction has been getting bigger. Share of farms without
any sells from one tenth of all farms n 1975 was less than 47o in 1990. Agriculturai marketing
transactions as a source of net income per farm and per mainly engaged in farming rose up
respectively with 58% and 10670 n 1994. This has been a result of progressive changes in
production stricture. Livestock income comprises less than 97o of total income. It used to be one
third of total income n1975. As a result of expansion of marketed (profitable) products the share
of crop production occupies 9l7o of the total farm income.
2 farms for which share of agricultural income is less than nonagricultural income
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The most significant changes have been in vegetable production. Its share in farm income
was 48o/o in 1975.Now it comprises two third of the total income. Despite of 4070 declined in
cultivatedland therehas been relativeand netincrease in harvested area of vegetables since 1960.
Now vegetables share is almost a half of total hawested area comparing with 
_less than l27a n
1960. For that period production area for vegetables increased more than two and a half folds.
Chinese cabbage, melon, cabbage and water melon occupy biggest part of cultivation area
and in production (Fig 1). Intensity of outside (marketing) transactions.is highest for these
vegetabl^es as the share bf marketed farms is bigger for the same_ products. All 
.vegetables have got
aiery high marketed ratio measures by share of products for sell in all-production.
- 
There has been around 4070 decrease in the harvested paddy since 1960. However,
contribution of rice production to total farm income has decreased slightly since 1975 comprising
187o of total figure n L994.
Amount of outside transacting for vegetable and rice production is also big as regards as
input supply. Share of purchased and paid items in total production costs for autumn chinese
cabbage^was 377o n l9%. In Yachio machi part of capi,tal.and.land supply for vegetable
produition are through outside (market) procurement. If we take in mind interest and land rent the
share of outside transacting in production costs shouid be much bigger. Share of costs for outside
procurement for other vegetab[e productions is usually bigger that one third. In Ibaraki prefecture
more than 377a of produ-tion costs for rice come through out farm transactions. Data shou's that




of different kinds of input supply and marketing transa-ctions 
. 
in
vegetable and rice productions will give us quite a good picture for a substantial. part 9f agtaian
tra-nsactions in Yachio machi. Investigation of various forms for organization of different
transaction and microeconomic factors fbr their development will present the agraian transacting
cost minimizing structure.
I-and is the main and irreplaceable resource in agriculture. Its productive use for vegetable
and rice cultivations is restricted from climatic seasons. It is also employed during erll production
process. Investments in land are usually long term lmprovements rn'hich effective life is much
ionger than production cycle. All those factors determine the ownership as principal organizations
of land supply transactions in agriculture. Only 0.267o of farms are without owned land in Yachio
machi and number of farms has been practically equal to number of land owners since l-960.
Farmers could hardly rely to get needed land through market transactions at the beginning
of each season. They also would have no incentive to make appropriate investments if they are.to
retum land after every production season. Paddy field is a good example in this sense since the
effective life of land investment is much bigger then rice production period. In vegetable
production potassium and phosphate ferlilizers have a such long lasting effect- It is.very difficult to
'"xpt"ss thii added "artificial" productivity of land through Tur\"l prices since it is not easy to
u"iify land quality. Besides farmers acquire special leaming by doing knowledge exploring same
plots of land' for a long time (such as fertility of land., crop rotation,. climate particllarity). This
ipecial knowledge has i character of transaction specific capital. That. i9 why internal (ownership)
oryanization ot long term iease are the most transacting cost minimizing modes for land supply
transactions in agricuiture.
In Yachi6 machi more than 9l7o of managed land is owned land in 1990. Since 1960 total
managed land decreased I47o while number of farmers draped off one fifth. Size of managed land
per farm have risen 8.27o for 30 years avengingl.lZha in 1990.
' Farms taking part in leaie in transactions account almost one quarter of all farms. Their
share in all farm hous^ehold has been reduced slightly since 1975. However) area under lease in
transactions in total farmland increased 3.3 points and comprises about 9% of the total managed
land. As a result share of leased in land in total managed land of renting farms increased' I-and
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Since actual starting of lease market in 19803 there has been gradual increase in share of
long term (more than 6 years) contracts both for newly and renewal sighed leases (Figures 2 and
3). Number of renewed contracts in all signed leases also has been grown and accounts for more
than7}% of total contracts after 1990 (Figure 4). Therefore, long term contracting and renewal the
contracts between same parties became the main modes for land supply transactions. In many
cases contragents are from same neighborhood, close friends or relatives, and usually contract
enforcement costs are low.
We have made a detailed suryey of all registered since 1980 land transactions in Nakatsubo
hamlet. Extension of farm size has been higher than on avetage for Yachio machi (Table 2). That is
a result of bigger involvement of farmers in agrarian transactions as most of them are vegetable
producers and more than 387o of farms are fuil time farms. Only for 1990-1994 managed farmland
has risen L4.87o (correspondingly 5.3% in Yachio machi). Increase of farm size has been
predominantly through upland land supply transactions as high as I97o for the period.
Table 2 Managed Farmland per Farm in 1994 (ha)










Total farmland 1.18 t.67
Source : Statistical Yearbook
Total managed farmland is almost as big as owned farmland. There is only 0.061ha net surplus
of land supply transactions in the hamlet. The biggest part of land supply transactions is organized by
full time farms. They own 61% of total farmland and their share in managed land is 670/o. Farmland is
an asset with high transacting specificity for the group of full time farmers since their total income
depends heavily on agriculture. Besides farmers labor and land supply transactions are in high
interdependency. That is the reason for high scale of internal (farm) organizations of land and labor
supply transacting. Average farm size of full time farms is 2.3 ha and this is 760/o higher than the
aveta1e for the hamlet. Average size of owned plots is higher for full time and part time I farms. Also
the number of plots managed by full time farmers is 55% higher than the average of 11.5 plots per
farm for the hamlet. Average plot..size of managed land exceed the average size of owned plots only
for full farmers. This means that business farms better than other farms use land supply organization
in order to explore economy of scale and scope. That is why they tend to extend both the number and
size of plots.
Irase mode is commonly used for organization of land supply transactions. Almosl 8o/o of
managed land in the hamlet is under lease in contracts. While share of lease out paddy is more than
l37o and there is negative balance of land supply transactions through this mode, the hamlet is a net
importer of upland through lease. Nearly one third of farmers take part in lease in transactions.
Intensity of this type of land supply transactions is the highest for full time farms as almost half of
them are involved in lease in land supply. Share of full time farmers rs 777o of total land under lease.
3 Before that land lease was heavily regulated in
Promotion of Agricultural I-and Utilization (1980) gives
negotiate conditions of lease.
favor of tenants. The law for
freedom for contracting partners to
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As much as 277o of farmers are involved in lease out transactions. Main contributes are part time II
and non farmers which account for more than 80% of leased out land. Only 5.47o of farms use both
lease in and lease out form for land supply transacting.
Share of land supply through lease in transactions constitutes 287o of the farms size of renting
!arm,s. For _upland supply transactions lease in is the main mode for more than 307o of manageEfarmland. Number of leased in plots is one third of managed plots and two third of them come up as
upland supply transactions. All types of farmers except part time I tend to lease in plots 'n ith an
aYerage size bigger than the size of owned plots. Size of renting farms is smaller than the average
farm size for the hamlet. All this means that farmers use lease as a main form for extension of farm
size. At the same time only full time and part time II farms among net leasers tend to lease out land.
However as little as 4.47o of their owned land is under leased out contracts. Therefore, they use
renting out as transactions minimizing mode as altemative to hiring labor on exceeding land.
All but full time farmers which lease out land have more than 347o of owned land under lease
out contracts. For net lesser full time farms this figure is less than 107o. To the biggest extend paddy
fields are involved in lease out transactions as their share reaches 42% of owned area. I-and owneis
which chose outside land supply transactions (such as rent out land) instead of internzrl organization
on owned land (family or hired labor, or contract service) is highest for part time II farms-. For this
group the decrease of farm size through lease out is more than a half of owned land. Contraction of
land supply for pzrt time II farmers reaches rp to 657o of owned paddies. The second biggest
contributor to_ paddy lease out hansactions are fulI time farmers. Thby are usually specialized in
vegetable production and keep out a part of paddy for own consumption. Our inve,stigation shows
that leasing out ful1 time farms usually lack family labor or are older in age and they gradually close
farm operations. Iand owners from part time II and full time farms rely on lease out mode of
transacting instead of increasing paddy cultivation through baying contract service or hiring labor.
I-ease out transacting for paddy is cheaper to cany out comparing to more expensive negotiaiion and
supervision costs for non family labor (or contractor).
Part time I farms do not lease out paddy and lease out transactions for non farmers are low.
Most of them cultivate paddies as "weekend farming" or are old in age and concentrate their efforts on
less labor intensive paddy cultivation. Some of them rely on highly standardized market for contract
service instead of renting out. Market procurement of inputs foi paddy is well developed and highly
standardized. Strong marketing regulations for rice make it easy to extend farm size tlrough intemal
organization of land supply. Area per plot under lease out transactions for all lessors but full time
farms is bigger than owned paddy and upland plots. This means that real farmers tend to use lease out
in order to adjust the effective farm size while other groups try to meet demand for big plots on lease
market.
Full time farmers have got 727o of all lease in contracts. Number of contracts per full time
leaser is I5o/o higher than the average of 2 for all leasers. At the same time number of plots per
contract for full farmers is higher than the average for paddy and low for upland. Since upland lease
in is the main way to increase farm size in this hamlet (accounting for 787o of all contracts) it means
that full time farmers tend to get such an extension with less costs per contract. However, as a result
of big number of small land ou,ners real farmers need more lease in transacting in order to get to the
effective size. Share of part time II and non farmers accounts for 807o of all contracts among the
group of positive lessors. Number of contracts per part time II and non'farmer lesser is higher than
the average of 1.3. Irase out transactions are most cost effective for full time farmers. That is because
they have more experience in outside transacting and rely less on this kind of land supply. Number of
leased out plots per contract is highest for full time and non farmers.
Term is not mentioned for about of 287o of the lease in contracts and they are supposed to be
with unlimited period. For the rest of the contracts the average term is 5.5 yeais for pa^ciAy and 4.7
years for upland lease. Only 670 of total contracts do not specify rent ievel. As much as 19% of
contracts are interlinked both for paddy and upland lease. Rent is higher for paddy transactions than
for upland lease, correspondingly 2269 yens and 1488 yens per 10 ar. For two third of interlinked
contracts a single rent level for paddy and upland has been applied; All registered contracts have cash
rent payments. Most farmers do not have problems finding leasers in the condition of decreasing
farms number and reduction of the cultivated land. Irase contracts have been repeated between same
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parties for a long period of time and transacting costs are low. Contracting parties usually apply low
standard rent. That is why even part time farmers prefer to use potential of family labor through
leased in land instead of facing big transaction difficulties offering family labor (or contract sewice)
on highly competitive agraian labor (and sewice) market.
Share of lease out contracts with non specified term and rent level is 307a. For rest of lease out
transactioncontracted period is 7.3 years for paddies and5.7 years for upland. Only one among all
registered contracts has rent payment in kind (1020kg brown rice per 10 ar). Rent per 10 ar for paddy
lease out transactions is bigger than for lease in contracts averaging 2754 yens. That is because
transacting costs to find a good partner and contract enforcement costs are much lower between
neighbors, and this compensates the lower level of rent at hamlet level transactions. Rent for lease out
and lease in upland transactions is the same since hamlet is net importer of leased land. In this case
dominant for the area rent is used also in inter hamlet transacting. As much as one fifth of all contracts
are interiinked both for paddy and upland lease out.
Among interviewed farms in Nakatsubo hamlet 787o reports that they lease in upland while
only 227o rent paddy. Most of interviewed farmers (867o) have been participating in lease in
transacting for more than 5 years. However, less than 297o have their lease in contracts registered in
the I-and Committee. All of questioned part time farmers have written lease contract and it is
registered. Among full time farmers less than l77o practice contract registration. No lease in contract
have been reported in written form for full time farms. Since real farms are the biggest leasers we can
suppose thaf the total area of farmland under lease transactions is much bigger than the official
figures. In our sample average operating size of farms is much bigger for full time farmers than it is
officially registered (Table 3). Therefore, real farm size and its enlargement through lease in
transacting mode is much bigger than in official papers.
Table 3 Owned and Managed Land by Different Types of Farm (ha)































lrased out land 0 0.17 0.7 0.53
Managed land 44.8 4 0.84 7.83
Source: Personal interviews
To the great extend the contract terms are well determined and understood by parties. There is
no need for written specification of conditions of transacting since partners expectations ary
standardized: first, land quality is well specified by authority for different categories paddy and
upland. Standard rent reflect quality differences and deviation for.technological opportunities (piot
location, land improvements etc) are easily negotiated; Second, in vegetable and rice production
transacting specific investments are low and usually limited for a season.Thus contract term does nor
matter foieiiher parties since transaction can be terminated any time without big loses for neither of
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parties. In this conditions it is cheap to get agreement and to verify meeting of contract terms (taking
care for land, due rent payments etc). Contract writing of standard obligations make no sense.
Moreover filling out of compiicated standard contract form prepared by authority does not look
necessary and it is time consuming. Big farmers usually carry out many iease transactions (many
contracts) and they change their partners frequently. Therefore, formal contract writing and
registration procedures make transacting unnecessarily costly. No wonder why widespread "illegal"
lease have taken place as a result. Another reported reason for shortage of registration of lease
contracts is "lack of desire of land owners to do so". This is likely in order to avoid tax payments or
fear for possible transfer of property (cultivating) rights to tenants. However, when a big transacting
specific investment in land are to be invoived then a written specification of terms is a requisite. This
has been the case of lease in contract between a cooperative and 5 land owners in Tsukuba for
establishment of the Civic Garden. Since the land supply transaction is supported by long term
specific investment (land improvements, buildings etc) by the Cooperative a contract period of 10
years have been specified.
More than 7l% of lease in contracts in our sample are with neighbors. However, big business
farms have their lessors from very large area up to the next prefecture. While most of contracts are
without fixed terms big farm operators usually apply short term lease. Almost 29o/a of contracts are
with fixed term and the average reported term is 2.2 years. In order to avoid decease problem and
needs for rotation the big vegetable producers prefer to use short lease (one or two seasons). Big
leasers tend to negotiate rent and they apply different level depending on plot size, location etc. The
largest leaser in the area pays 33Vo higher than standard rent for plots bigger than t ha. Small farms
usually contract standard rent in their lease in transactions. No one reports that difficulties exist to find
out land for lease.
In the most of the cases a third part involvement in lease transactions is reported. While no
part time farms uses a mediator, every two out of three full time farmers rely on a third part
involvement in transacting. In all cases this is some private agent or partner. Two third of leasers
point out the important role of the fertilizer dealer in contract mediation. Full time farmers need a great
number of plots from large dispersed area to carry out farm operations effectively. In order to get
economy of scale for highly specialized production, and to avoid disease and soil exhaustion they
have to change plots every 2-3 years. One big vegetable producer changes plots (respectively lessors)
every season. In this condition the costs of finding partners, checking quality of land, developing
confidence between partners, and for negotiating become very high for individual farmers. The third
part involvement mode develops to save on transacting costs or to make transacting at such a large
scale possible at all. Manager of the Agrocorporation reports that the number of his lessors reach up
to 100 land owners from a large area. Fertilizer dealer finds out and negotiates lease in contracts for
him. This is not costly for the merchant since he visits frequently many farms in large area and knows
available land for lease, its quality etc. Also he has got confidence of land owners as a result of long
common business experience. Dealer provides this service for free since the Agrocorporation is a big
customer for his chemicals. Stable interlinked transacting mode developed which save transactions
costs for all parties. In the same manner many land owners from Nakatsubo hamlet use the respect of
the hamlet leader to rent their land through his mediation. Hamlet leader is a fertilizer dealers and he
is interested in extending farm operations of his clients. Again a third pard mode of transacting with a
strong interlinked character replaces direct contracting between partners.
Among questioned farmers all part time znd I47o of the full time farmers are involved in
leased out transactions. All these transactions are for upland lease out. I-and under lease is smal1 and
less than 6% of owned land. All lessors use neighbors as partners. Usually term in not specified and
standard (fixed by authority) rent is applied. No owner reports that he executes any control on leased
out land. A1l intewiewed say that there are many possible choices for partners and that it is not a
problem to find out leasers. Usually farmers rent the land to someone they rely to: friends or relatives.
As one of interviewed points out "there are mumy choices to rent out but it is difficult to find a good
lesser". Those farmers who chose not to sell land but lease out mode apparently intend to keep the
farm. For them not the rent level but to be a good farmer is important when they look for partner to
lease out land. That is why they rely more on personal than market (price) relationships for lease out
transacting.
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We have made a detailed study of all registered sales land transactions in Nakatsubo hamlet
since 19724. For the period 6.27o of land has been sold out while share of bought land in owned land
hasbeen 3.67o. There has beendecrease infarm transactions inthe hamletthrough ownership mode
on land since 7972. Both number of sell out transactions and amount of sold out land is higher than
purchasing transactions and size of bought up farmland (Table 4). Hamlet has been net exporter of
land and the role of ownership in increasing farm transactions is lower than in the beginning of the
period. Most intensive transactions for transfer of ou,nership were carried out between 1982-1986.
For this subperiod more than 607o of sold out land was transacted. For the same period only 327o of
total increase of owned land through baying transactions were registered and no purchase occurred
before the date. However, after 1987 there has been positive balance of 5000 sq.m. between bought
and sold farmland. While almost 707o of total bought land has been for the last 7 years only 3070 of
sells transactions occurred since. Therefore, importance of acquisition of farmland for extension of
farm transactions in the hamlet tends to increase relatively and absolutely.
Table 4 Land Transactions in Nakatsubo Hamlet (sq.m.)
Source: l-and Commission, Yachio machi
4 Since all changes in land ownership have been strictly registered our analysis includes
all real transactions during the period




















































Total 18288 26664 r0722 15061
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Share of upland in total sold out land is 597o. Roughly same is the share of bough upland in
total purchased land. Average arca pil purchased transactions is higher than area per sold out
transactions. It means that purchasing transactions have been to the bigger extent connected with
increasing the size of participating farms.
Almost one forth of all farms in the hamlet have taken part in purchasing transactions since
L972. Nearly 4070 'arnong full time farmers bought up land and their share in purchased land in about
600/o. Second biggest contributor have been part time II farms which acquired more than one third of
bought up land. Part time I farms have not participated in land ou,nership acquisition type of
transacting.
Share of bought up area is higher than the share of purchased plots only for full time farmers.
At the same time share of sold out land by this group is less than 107o and smaller than the share of
sold out plots. This means that full time farmers use better than other groups o\ /nership extension of
farm increasing both farm and plot sizes. While bought up land per farm is bigger for part time farms
the average purchased upland is highest for full time farms. Size of purchased paddy plot is biggest
for part time farmers. That is because part time farms use ownership integration of paddy b get to
effective size of part time operations while full time farms use paddy extension to satisfy own
consumption demands or for subordinate farming activity.
On average bought up farmland accounts for more than 10% of managed land of purchasing
farms, while sold out land in less than 87o of owned land of the same farmers. Full time farms use
less ownership mode to increase farm size. Bought up land comprises only 77o of their managed land
and sold out land is less than I7o of owned land. Part time farmers use to the biggest extend
ownership extension as a means to increase farm size. The share of purchased land in their managed
land is 287o while there is less than 37o sold out land of owned land. The biggest share of all
purchasing transactions is split betu,een full and part time II farms (477o pu each group). However,
land per paddy and upland transactions is much larger for full time farmers. This means that business
farms carry out purchase transacting much more effectively.
Only full time farmers use service of the Kenkusho to mediate their land supply transactions.
The share of the third part involvement of Kenkusho is one third of all paddy transactions and 17% of
upland purchases. Part time farmers are small buyers and they usually use personal relations in
neighborhood to extend land ownership. On the other hand full time farmers have big demand for size
of land and plots which can hardly be meet in neighborhood. That is u'hy they use Kenkusho
assistance to minimize on large scale searching costs of transacting.
One out of tree land owners has taken part in sell transactions. More than 70o/o of net sellers
are parl time II and non farmers. Their share in sold out lend is more than 807o and they executed
more than 707o of ali sells transactions. More than a half of total bought by the net seilers land is by
full time farms. Size of sold out plots and of the land per sold out transaction are smallest for the full
time farmers. On average sold out land accounts formore than one fifth of the owned land of net
sellers. ReaI farmers squeezed ownership land supply only on 67o of the size of owned land. Share of
bought up land in managed land of selling farms is a little more than 87o and it is equally represented
by all groups. Only part time I farmers and non farmers use Kenkusho to sell out land. Its third part
involvement is registered accordingly on 507o of transactions for the first group and on l4Vo of
transactions in the second.
Purchasing of farmland is altemative mode for land supply to lease in contract. Accordingly
selling out land is the altemative to lease out contract. Different forms for organization of land supply
transactions are associated with different control, incentive and risk futures. As a result costs for
transacting differ and farmers chose the most economical way for land supply. When a farmer buys a
piece of farmland he transfers outside land supply transacting with integral (ownership) mode. It
means that he gets full control on land supply transactions and there must be some incentives to do
so. For instanCe, if he leases in land and apply fixed rent he would bear all risk of crop failure or
market fluctuation of prices. This king of risk could be overcome by practicing share rent if no
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institutional restrictions exist for this modes. On the other hand when a farmer sell out farmland he
either chooses more effective forms for land gupply transacting (e.g.lease contract) or decides to
increase farm size on the bases of different kinds of iransacting (ivesloct operation, providing farm
services etc).
In 1ny case there must be some transaction difficulties or extraordinary costs for selecting ofthe internal (ownership) mode of transacting. Transaction difficulties could be associaterl wii-h a
strong third part regulation of le_ale market. It could be high level of transacting costs for repeated
contracting 1n -a 1arg9. scale. However, the most fundamental reason for-internalizing sometransactions is the condition of trigh asset specificity. This could be some long term investrients in
land like building, trees etc. It is very risky for farmers to rely on short term-iease market for land
supply since his investments are lock up in the land. That is because possibility for opportunistic
behavior of counterpart at contract relewal time is very high. There is a great risk to lose transacting
specific capital in t!" con-ditions of high uncertainty of development of lease market (termination of
contract, renegotiation of terms etc). Farmer either will nof make such investments or he will
overcome transacting difficulties through,ownershif mode. In farming the human capital (e.g.learning
by doing experience) would have such high specificity to particular farmland, production Jt.. at o"y
rate farmers always keep full control on some critical mass of land suppfy through ownership
otganization. that is to.avoid de^pendance on outside trzmsacting for this important agrari"an input.Since the acquisition of farmland is connected with -big long term inves-lment in'specific
agraian. capital^the extension of farm size through purchase of land rJsults in increasing traniacting
specificity of farm capital. 
. 
This is especially thiough for the conditions of uncerTainty about
development of 
,agraian policy, constant reduction ol agrarian economic value of farmland, andheavily regulated (undeveloped) farmland market. That is why when a farmer decides to quit farming
he usually^transfer his assets into more universal form (e.g.money). It is because transacting costs
and risk of ke^eping the capital in highly transacting specific(e.g.fannland) form and renting it"out are
much higher for non farmers.
One of the main restrictions for extension of farms through land purchase in Yachio machi has
been extremely higfr farmland price (as high as 133 times of the annuai rent in 1995). According to
some interviewed farmers if they invest in land they would get no positive income. Hornever,"no
questioned 
_fan1er reports that there is any capital restriction to incre^ase farm size as much as ih"y
want. Besides land is a special (undepreciable) klnd of capital and incentives to invest in such a long
lasting assets must be strong. That is why many farmers lieep land as a stable form of capital and usb
it only for.part time farming. The main reason for the long term high price of farmland has been big
non agrarian economic value of farmland. Owners expectation to transfer their farmland tb
infrastructure development projects, housing etc during the-period of economic boom blocked many
effective land supply transactions both via ownership mode or lease.
lack of desire to sell farmland is another factor for slow development of land market. Some
land owners kee.p doing farming for own consumption or as free time lavorite occupation (hobby).
Some of them intend to become farmers after retirement from other businesses. For manv land
owners farm and farmland as a symbol has a special non economical value. As much as one tirir<l ot
interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo hamlet point out that "preservation of the farm for future
generations" has been one of main reasons for their farm activiiy. Since farmland is the most specific
asset for agraian transactions, preservation of farm is not identified witli farm transactions but witir
presewation of control (ownership) on land. As far as future plans are concerned more than 22% of
questioned farmers put preservation of the farm as priority. On the other hand for generation of
predominant land owners to "sell land means to lose reputation". That is why when t[ey decide to
quite farming and sell out the land they usually look outside own neighborhood.
Post war policy toward "owner oriented farmism" has put many legal restrictions for
ownership transfer on farmland in Japan. Even nowadays it is almolt imposliblJfor non farmers to
5 However, fixed rent has incentive advantages since lesser gets zrll net product.
Ultimately which king of lease contract will be implemented depends on risk aversion of land
o\ rner and tenant.
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buy farmland and to start farm business. Business organization iike company is prohibited to take part
in land transactions at all.
Dominant until 1980 policy for "strong rights of tenant" blocked any incentive of tenant
farmers to buy land. Their cultivating rights could not be terminated by land owner. This specific
form for land supply were enforced through a third part Government involvement in transactions. In
fact tenants had full control on leased in land such as internal (ownership) mode but not formal title of
land. They got zr11 advantages of ownership form without any costs for transacting. They saved not
only current costs for negotiating, contract writing etc but big investments in transacting specific
assets. They had no incentives to invest in land. The opposite was true since a large transacting
specific capital is involved. No wonder why tenants did not apply ornnership mode for farm
extension. Land market could not develop if there is no lease market. Otherwise land owners take zLll
risk of losing the value of transaction specific capital (tenants quit farming) and tenants enjoy full
benefits for free. That is the main reason why practically all ownership land transactions in our
Nakatsubo suryey have been carried out after 1980. While this specific mode of a third part
involvement in land supply transactions was very effective for post war conditions it u,as out of date
in eighties. This policy was shift toward giving full authority of private parties to negotiate
organization of their land supply.
Some fuil time farmers are getting back their leased out under previous regulations land and
they do not have to buy new land. Some of them also own forestry and when it is necessary they
easily extend the farm size through transfer it into farmland. Some of interviewed farmers present as
reason for buying farmland requests for neighbors who quit farming.
However, there must be some other economic reasons for farmers reluctancy to use
ownership land supply mode. In the case of paddy fields (which are strongly connected with rice
production) farmers worries are easy to understand. Decrease of the demand and prospects for market
liberalization put highly specific investments in paddy in unfavorable (from the view point of
efficiency) lock up regime. The same high asst specificity during the period of strong regulation of the
rice production and guaranteed income was positive incentive to keep paddy cultivation under farmer
ownership. Even part time farms have taken advantages of guaranteed rice marketing and income, and
well develop inputs supply, and highly standardized technology, keeping land via internai mode.
Many of them practically have been involved in farming very little using easy to carry out contract
service mode to support farm operations.
Llberalization of the Japanese agraian markets make it difficult for vegetable farms to compete
as well. Long term structure of demand and market access of individual producers is impossible to
predict. Investments in farmland become highly specific for future agraian transactions with big
uncertainty for development. That is why even business farmers prefer to extend farm size on the
base of lease in mode of land supply. Instead of bearing the risk of long term lock up investments in
highly specific assets they chose more effective transacting lease mode. This form for organization
gives them flexibility to adjust farm size according to current changes in structures of agraian
transactions (inputs and output markets) for less costs. First, it assures them easy supply of necessary
land from speedily extending lease market; Second, besides saving on direct investments for farm size
adjustment, this mode for land supply avoids the risk of losing the value of transacting specific
capital. Moreover, lease mode allows business farmers to avoid rotation and decease problems,
expktring fully advantages of specialization and economy of scale. Ttansacting costs to change
ownership (buy and sell land) on many plots every two-tree seasons would be very high.
We have examined some critical dimensions of land supply transactions which blocked
extension of farm size through one or another land supply mode. However, following this line we
can not explain why farm size has not changed too much for last thirty years. Otherwise it would be
difficult to argue why land ourners chose sell out mode or lease the land out, instead of hiring labor or
contract services on their owned land To get these answers we should look at general framework of
all kinds of agrarian transactions and at structure of total transacting costs. The most obvious
restriction for expansion of farm size through internalizing agrarian transactions apparently is the high
transaction costs of hired labor
The main mode for organization of labor supply transactions in agriculture is use of family
labor. That is why the basic business organization in agriculture is usually described as "family
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farm". Family labor supply has big transaction saving advantages in comparison both with outside
labor supply (e.g.contract service) and internal organization of non family labor (e.g.employment
contract). Agricultural technology is very flexible and can be hardly standardized. Efficiency of
different farming operations depends on their carrying out in a due time according to specific changes
in climate conditions (e.g.yield level highly varies according to precision and timely herbicide
treatment, water supply etc). At the same time quality of labor input is very difficult to verify and
permanent monitoring costs would be very high. Family labor supply is self enforced since family
members share not only business but human goals. Family ties and informal relationships make
business transactions between them castles to carry out. Transaction costs for coordination of
activities, building incentive structure, and dispute resolution among family members are very low. In
many cases family organization is based on authority of the head of the households and management
decisions are easy to implement.
To the great extend efficiency of farm management depends on personal abilities and
experience of farmers ("good" and "bad" farms). Production management can not be standardized and
planed beforehand in great details. Thus the human capital is with a big importance for farming and in
many cases it is with a high farm specificity. In developed market economies namely this specificity
allows a farmer to get extra rent from running its own farm. Otherwise he would prefer the alternative
to sell his standard skills on labor market. In modern farming where farm operations are higtrly
standardized (e.g.paddy cultivation) almost all transactions can be organized through outside
contracts. Therefore the farm size depends on the management capital of the farmer which is high
farm specific. Otherwise it is very difficult to explain why in the same industry and similar conditions
there are so big differences in farm size. In our Nakatsubo survey the largest farm is 45 ba while the
smallest is less than t ha. Different farmers explore to the different extent managerial possibility to
extend farm size.
Supervision costs for implementation of non routine management decisions with extension of
labor supply are very high. Therefore, either individual farm operations ("farmer is his own master")
or use of low transacting costs (e.g.family) labor. While market competition has high intensive
potential to coordinate labor supply through price system internal labor organuation meets limits of
high enforcement costs. That is why the extension of farm size through labor supply transactions is
determined to the great extent by possibility to use family labor for critical farm operations. When
hired labor is applied that is for routine easy to control and with low risk farm operations. In many
cases increases of outside labor supply transacting depends on possibility to use self enforcing
contracts such as output based compensation for hired labor or contracting service. Application of
those modes depends on standardization of farm operations, and from possibility to verify
relationships between labor efforts and results. In many respect these modes are altemative to rent
sharing in land supply transactions, and they depend on the extend of risk and risk aversion of
partneis. In farming very frequently contract labor supply transactions are interlinked with providing
accommodation and food for hired labor or in some cases with land supply transactions.
In Yachio machi as a result of increasing productivity of technology and mechanization of
farm operations the famiiy labor per farm has decreased more than one third since 1975. Replacement
of labol supply with materialized inputs supply transactions has taken place. Extension of farm size
has been aChieved with substantial decrease of iabor supply both as absolute level and as share in total
agraian inputs. Technological development has also-changed_g_ender structure.of the family labor
increasing women contribution in all labor supply. While n 1975 men were 727o of family labor, in
1990 men share in family labor declinedto 567o.
According to census data labor supply organization is highly limited to family labor. In 199O
number of family members engage in farming per farm is2.53, respectively 1.66 mainly engage in
farming. Less than 0.2% of farms hire person on yearly base in 1990 while thirty years agothis
numbei was more than ZVo.It has been a result of mechanization of routine and labor intensive farm
operations. At the same time technology sophistication increases transaction, costs_to find good
workers (quality requirements) and to supervise them (complication of operation). This extremely
limits extension of farm size on the base of employment contract mode for labor supply transactions.
At the same time number of yearly hired persons pff farm increased almost twice for thirty years
averaging 2 n 1990. This means that possibility to control hired labor relatively enlarged with
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developrnent of technology. For the same period farms with seasonal and daily based workers
increased two fold accounting for 4.8% of all farms in 1990. Between I975-1990 number of seasons
with hired labor per hiring farm increase 2.3 times and reached to 42.
Traditional for Japanese agriculture form for informal nonmonetary and interlinked labor
supply, known as "exchange labor", gradually decrease from about 9% n 1975 to less than 2Vo n
1990. At the same time person exchange per farm has been almost the same averaging 15.
Widespread distribution of this mode used to be connected with exploring the effect of labor
cooperation and economy of scale, necessity of carrying out of farm operation in short time, getting
benefits from community work etc. However, direction of technological development has been
toward individual than group farm operations. When labor supply is connected with development or
maintenance of common assets (infrastructure, water supply), and they are highly farm specific, then
a special (farm) organization to govern this transactions is necessary. That is how I-and improvement
districts or (and) Hamlet organization of this activities has been set up to secure control on
transacting. When operations are standardized then market procurement (e.g.contracting) of labor
supply has been increasingly practiced.
Another topical for Japanese agriculture mode for labor supply organization such as "free
help" is get by 2.6% of farms. Comparing to 1975labors without pay per farm increase 4'/7o to about
14 per farm. This form of labor supply organization is still practicing as help to relatives and
neighbors or old farmers. However, it has no economic importance as labor supply mode.
In our suryey of Nakatsubo hamlet the average number of family members per farm is 2.9 for
fuli time and 1.5 for part time farms. Part time farmers spent for farming 150 days a year while
business farmers are engaged twice as much. Only full time farms hire labor and 28o/o of interviewed
report existence of early base contract. Sample number of hired labor excess statistical figure for all
Yachio machi as much as three folds. Therefore, we can suppose that farm size extension on the base
of ("illegal") hiring mode is much bigger than the official data. This is partly because of a great
number of illegally hired foreigners.
When a farmer turns to employment contract mode for labor supply there must be some
transaction costs minimizing reason. Why does he choose a long term form for organization of
transacting instead of relying on daily labor market? It could be economizing on frequently repeated
costs for finding appropriate person, for negotiation, for duty specification, for direction and
supervision of newly hired labor etc. This might be in order to overcome risk of labor prices
fluctuation or possible shortage of qualified labor in pick seasons. It could be return on farm specific
human capital which hired labor acquire (learning by doing) working on the same farm. In all cases
the internal organization of transacting (employment contract) has big advantages for either parties
comparing to market mode. In the former two cases this is simply saving on direct transaction costs
while in the later one this is opportunity for both partners to get extra rent through integral mode of
transacting (exploring farm specificity of the human capital). That is why wages of yearly based
workers are higher than for daily based labor.
The reason for a special long term form for labor supply could be uncertainty of outside labor
supply. That is when a farm depends heavily on special skills of outside worker (e.g.veterinary
service, maintenance of machinery etc). It can not be bought as specialized service on market or
market procurement is associated with transacting difficulties (e.g.risk form opportunism, insecure
supply etc). This high farm unilateral dependency from labor of particular partner usually brings the
internal labor supply organization as a result. Since labor detailed duty specification in contracting
time would be very expensive or impossible permanent labor contracts have no duty specification in
all interviewed farmers. Our suryey in Nakatsubo hamlet shows that wage level is time based and
vary according quality of labor (e.g.possession of driving license). Increase of wage level usually
depends on the period of on farm experience. Also hired labor is provided free housing, food,
bonuses for good achievements. Only in a big Agrocorporation insurance for employees is included
as a part of the contract. All big business farms apply higher ware rate than the average in the region.
In a half of cases combine time and output base compensation is practiced. All those futures of
employment contracts come up to express this high farm specificity (and consequently return) of
human capital. This is also the way to prevent any transacting difficulties that might occur if market
mode form of labor supply is used.
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While in a half of interviewed cases the reason for employment contract is to "supplement
family labor", all others use this mode in order to "enlarge business". In the Agrocorporation size is
increased through internalizing labor supply transacting up to 28 yearly based workers. Apparently
transacting costs to supply this labor on daily based contracts would be very high. However,
extension of farm size is connected with increasing internal transacting (management) costs.
Development of a special internal structure to minimize on intrafarm coordination costs becomes
necessary. Specialization of management functions come up as result and two division managers are
appointed. Since their human capital is highly transacting specific (valuable) to the Agrocorporation
their compensation is time based and as proportion of owner salary. The form of permanent
employment contract is the most appropriate mode. On the other hand one of most important
problems before of the Manager of the Agrocorporation comes out to be "to find good division
managers". Selecting of quzrlified labor takes a big part of overall management time. Accordingly
special procedures are applied to recruit such personnel outside local labor market (e.g.advertisement
in newspapers). Manager concern is also the high turnover of regular labor as contracts term is less
than 2 years. That is connected with low return of (preliminary) transacting costs for developing
employment contract mode. Since many of labors are foreigners (more than one third for the
Agrocorporation) their mobility is high as well as testing period is applied. Problems connected with
group working is also reported. All those add to the level of current transaction costs through this
mode of labor supply.
If operational size (total farm transactions) is not big enough then the cost for special
transaction mode for outside labor transacting are not justified (tto employment contracts).
Development of good skills to all ffitical activities come up as a requirement to run own farm. That is
why the farmer is to be at the same time a good agronomist, mechanic, manager etc, and he must have
long on job training experience before to stzrt own farm. On the other hand if a farmer has free labor
resources he can sell them out on standardized service and (or) labor markets or to become a part time
farmers. In our suryey no farmer reports using such a labor supply mode.
Japanese farmers inherit the farm and farming activity for many generations. For many
modern farmers to be a farmer has a special value. That is why the farm size does not depend always
on economic efficiency. Those farmers do not apply at any time the most transacting saving mode for
labor supply. It is not rare case when they are ready to accept even less income than their opportunity
costs instead of selling (renting out) the farm and entering the job market.
Routine and non farm specific (universal) labor supply transactions can easily be get from
current (daily) labor or service market. In this case a farmer is not unilaterally dependant from skills
of particular partner (or contractor) and changing of partners is not associated with big transacting
cosJs. He either uses service market for highly standardized operations or hires labor on daily
(seasonal) bases from labor market. There is not necessity to negotiate the conditions for exchange
since market price coordinate transactions effectively. Many of the interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo
practice orderlng contract service through a phone call. Contract conditions are standard (standard
bperation, standard price etc) and transacting costs are low.^ Usually "phone call" mode is used for daily based labor supply too. Difference here is that
labor is used for various and routine operations. It is hired for some (short) time during which it is
directed (managed) by farmer. Detailed contracting is not necessary and.it would be too expensive.
Since employer does not depend on speciai skills of a particular person, h'e can effectively use market
(or turn to the market) instead of transacting through costly employment contract. In two third of
interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo only general duty specification is used. Another one third get
detailed duty specifications. As much as on 3370 of. contracts for daily supply labor output base
compensation is applied.In this case efficiency of organization of transaction is similar to service
supply mode since both forms have strong self enforcing potential. Differences are that in service
supply mode contractor is independent and labor supply organization is interlinked with input suppiy
m6de (machinery service, chemical distribution etc). Hired labor supply is directed by manager and
more frequently input supply is organized by farmer.
Big part of business farms (as much as 437o of interviewed) use daily based contracts for
labor supply. For two third of cases the purpose of this mode i.s to enlarge business rather to
supplement family labor. All of the farms hire the same persons all time and contract relationships
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have been more than for two years. One of the farmers reports that transactions with one of his daily
hired workers have been continuing for 30 years. This long term partnerships saves costs to find
daily workers, to renegotiate hiring conditions, to specify requirements, to get know labor skills, to
develop confidence between partners etc. Therefore, personal than market orgarization is more
important for this kind labor supply transactions. Many of daily based hired workers are female.
Since they have high incentive to work hard and get own income supervision costs are very low.
All interviewed farmers do not have problems to find out workers and many possible choices
of partners are reported. Special mode to save on transacting costs for both parties in short term labor
supply is developed and provided by specialized market agent (brokers).
No whiten contract for labor supply organization has been reported. That is a result of long
term relationships between partners. Also strong tradition in the Japanese rural community is still
alive when a contract is to be set up. Here the gentlemen agreement between partners is much more
important than any signed contract.Only case of whiten contracting in our survey is between family
members (spouses). However, that is in order to register a special business farm organization
(corporation) and to save tax payments.
When a labor supply transaction is not supported by specific assets, when uncertainty to carry
out the transaction is small, and when transacting frequency is low, then the most efficient way to
organize such a transaction is through service market mode. Instead of hiring labor manager trust the
rn'ork to a contractor. The more standardized farm operations are, the less transacting costs are for
contracting, control, dispute resolution for service supply. Due to progressive changes in technology
working hours per 10 ar of rice production have been reduced more than twice since 1975 (Table 5).
Since operations are highly standardized and time for execution very short many farmers have
replaced intemal labor supply mode with outside service supply. Through this mode they can support
farm operations saving investment costs for modernization, getting cheap specialized service from
market, and realizing potential of their off farm opportunity costs. Those farmers only concentrate
their efforts on qitical (transacting expensive) operations and leave all (transacting cheap) others on
market mode. In the conditions of the strong third part regulations of marketing of ice (zero
marketing transaction costs) widespread part time organization of farm management comes up to be
the most effecting form.
























Source: Second Asian Crop Science Conference, Fukui Prefectural GovernmenI,1995
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In Yachio machi the share of farms which contract service for paddy cultivation has increased
substantial for 7975-L990 (Table 6). Almost for all main operations ^the share of contracting farms
becomes quite big in the e1d of the period. Only exception is-the critical spread of chemical wh"ich has
been kept through internal (family or hired labor supply) mode. The share of contracts with farmers
has been.the bigg.est- However, the contracting mode with farmers (cooperative) and specialized
organizations relatively increased. According to the management of the local Cooperative part time
farms are the main users of their machinery service and of the Cooperative rice center.
{e_a per contract for different operations has not been piactically changed since 1975. For
commercial farms this figure is only slightly bigger. Therefore, the poiential to enlarge farm size
through contract supply--transactions has not been effectively used. If has been a result of already
discussed transactin-g difficulties to extend farm size on the base of land supply transacting
The share of paddy area under different contract operations is much smaller than the share of
contracted farms. For each main operation contracting farms usually use service supply for all amount
of the work rather as supplementary to internal mode. Therefore, increasing nuiib"r of small size
farms rather than bigger operators tend to apply contract service supply mode.-
The share of farms which contract everything from seedling to processing but spread of
chemical approaches one third of rice farms. The share of farms wtrictr contract 6verything from
seedling to trashing has.been increasing as well. This is a quite different mode since piacti&lly all
production management t:* suspended.To the great extend this kind Of contract service supply is equal
to the short (one season) land lease out mode. Accordingly it could be similar to fix rint when a
standard or other negotiated fixed pricg. is applied,. or to share rent when contract price is set up in
proportion to the gu^tput (and costs)..Since operations are highly standardized variation of yiel'd is
low. Moreover risk from crop failure is shared through specialorganization (insurance cooper"atives).
Highly competitive service supplymarket is practically transacting tee to use ("phone calls orders"j.
lo"g-J"tl lease mode only. would 1o-* up farmers control on owned land wifhout any transactingbenefits. Besides lease regulations and conlrol of rent level make it less effective to use llase out land
supply mode compare to contracting of all farm operations. On the other hand, for a specialized
contractor investments are not transacting specific (dependant) to particular customer. Thdy usually
enjoy extending demand for such services along with increasing the number of part time iarms. In
q?.ny cases contractors il? lot specialized in ssrvice supply but only apply this mode to get more
efficient use of own (extra) farm resources. There is not-any transaction-rie6As for internaliZing land
supply. through lease. The opposite is truth since implemeniation of rice reduction system limits the
extension of farm size.. That is w-!l the flexible Ghgrt term) service contracting instead of (long term)
lease out is chosen as the most effective mode for either sides of transacting.
Contract service for other crops has been sharply increasing receni years. In 1990 more than
9? of farms.practice this form of organization of transacting comparing with 0.047o five years ago.Howevet, this mode is less intensively used since only I.7% of managed land is under contracts-in
7990. Exceptions are wheat and burley where one forth of producers u.se contract mode and 207a of
the area is under contract service supply organization. Similar to the rice cultivation operations for
tl,heal and burley are higtrly standardized and transacting costs for outside (contract) supply are less
than internal mode.
Share of farms which provide contract service is around 270 (Table 7). While their share has
not changed since L975 the number of farms decreased almost one fifth. The biggest part of farms
provide only rice cultivation. Share of the farms supplying contract service for other crops tend to
mcrease.
One third of service supplying farms for paddy contract all works for rice. Contracted area per
farm is 1.8 ha and it increased more than twice for 1980-1990. Therefore, contracting farms
increasingly use transacting minimizing potential of this mode. Area per contracting farms fbr main
operation has,loJ changed or decrease for 15 years. This means that farms apply this mode in order to
make more efficient use of extra resources rather than as specialized market activity. Apparently lease
in mode for extension of farm size is more effective for farmers than outside service ^supply iorm of
transacting. For seedling production share of contracting farms has.decreased u'hile the arbi per farm
increased almost 9 times. However, that is because of a new level of minimum effective scale of
operation to trade off against transacting costs for seedling contract.
_'t I
lndicators 1975 7990
Share of farms contracting 17.4 56.4
Seedling production
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Seedling to threshing n.a. 3.6
Seedling to processing n.a. 6.4
Everything but chemical n.a. 28.5




Table 7 Share of Contract Providing Farms (per cent)
Indicators t975 L990
Contract providing farms 2.2 2.7
Contracting only nce 97.2 94.8
Contracting other crops t2.7 27.6
Providing all works for rice*
























































In Nakatsubo hamlet as much as 8670 of interviewed full time farmers use some kind of
service supply contract. As much as 83% of them contract operations for paddy cultivation. Service
supply contracts are usually for different operations in busy seasons. Contracts for plowing, leveling,
preparation for transplanting, transplanting, harvesting and drying are reported. Rice production is
not the main business for any of the farmers. Therefore, they use this mode in order to save on
transacting costs for subordinate farm activity rather than to extend farm size. Only Agrocorporation
contracts service for vegetable production. That is for fertrlizer distribution on small operational area
which is done for few days.
Phone calls mode is broadly used in contracting. Most of contract supply transacting (837o) is
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with individual farmers. Only one farmer gets the service from the Cooperative. Reported reason is
"easy to request and low pdce". In all cases long term contract relationships have been reported.
Standard (recommended by cooperative and local Government) rate is used in all contracts. Payment
for private suppliers is usually after delivery of the service. The farmer who use the Cooperative
service doest not know when the payment time is since money are transferred directly from his
cooperative account. Irss than L77o of contracting farms execute some control on supplied service.
According to a farmer he is interested to control the quality of service. When he delivers tea and cake
during hawesting or shows fields for work he also executes control on service supply.
No full time farmer reports having a contract for providing service. Fort them extension of the
farm size through land lease in and (or) labor supply transacting modes is less expensive than service
contracts. Among part time farmers one farmer reports practicing service supply transactions. He has
got a 15 years interlinked contract with a land owner. The farmer supply plowing and transplanting
paddy operations in exchange for the land rent. However, only one forth of his lease in land is under
such interlinked contract 'vr.ith service supply transactions. Interlinked mode reflects more demzmd of
land owner for contract service rather than desire of farmer to extend farm size through supplying
contract service. Apparently for part time farms it is more economical to apply internal labor supply
organization or outside input supply mode instead of short term service supply. In the later case they
prefer to adjust farms size either through market transactions buying finished products (inputs) or via
long term lease out contracts.
Distribution of farmers time between routine and ffitical operations, and for introduction of
innovation is quite different for various main productions in Nakatsubo (Table 8). In paddy
cultivation only 777o of farmers time is for critical operation and no time for innovation is reported.
For melon production less than 4LTa of total time is spent for routine operations. Efforts leve1 for
different activities also depends on the farm size. Those figures gives us an idea for potential of
deferent farms to use various altemative forms for organization of their agrarian transactions.
Transacting difficulties to use outside mode (such as contract service and daily labor) in paddy
cultivation is smallest since the share of standardized and routine operations is big. In vegetable
production efforts for critical operations and for innovation are high. This limits costs saving potential
of outside modes for carrying out farm transactions. Efficiency of outside forms decreases
particularly when the size of farm operations becomes very big. That is why the Agrocorporation
relies predominately on integral labor supply mode (long term employment contract) rather than to the
altemative transacting forms (contract service or daily based labor contract).
There have been two big projects for land consolidation of paddy and upland in Nakatsubo
hamlet. Those projects u'ere under special Prefectural and National programs for development of
agricuiture. Investments for these large scale projects are highly transaction specific to participating
farmers. Market or private organizations could be very expensive to carry out such service supply
transactions at effective scaie. Third part public involvement through subsidy, organizational and
technical assistance has been very important for success of those transacting. In order to overcome
free riding rn organization of service supply, financial and labor participation of erll farmers have been
important (compulsory) for canying out such projects. Since their large scale, high asset specificity,
less frequency (unique character), the joint ownenhip mode with strong third part involvement has
been the most effective for transacting. Regional I:nd Improvement District is a large farmers
organization for carry out such common (project) service supply. Numbe'r of members is 5666 farms
and it covers area of more than 2100 ha in 8 municipalities. According to the District staff a ne'*.
project has been promoted recently for upland water supply. However, farmers do not want to start
this pruject since the high price of water supply. Thus the mode has an incentive potential to involve
individual farmers in the management of the otganization. It also gives members control power and
when farmers find it necessary they stop development of projects promoted by authority.
Among non material (intangible) services extension supply and insurance supply are most
commonly used. Only full time farmers participate in extension supply transactions and 577o of them
report they use some extension service. According to the local Extension oflice their main clients are
full time and part time I farms. Public extension supply in Japan has got a long history as an effective
third part involvement in agrarian transactions. It is organized by Prefectural Government and
financed by the Prefectural and National budgets. For individual farmers this service has a public
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good character and it is provided for free. Extension service transactions are characterized by high
uncertainty, and asset specificity and low frequency. At the same time little appropriability and
divisibility and measurability are main futures of intangible extension output. Big transactions
difficulties are in place for both suppliers and consumers (farmers). Private organization of extension
supply transactions would fail to occur at effective scale. Strong necessity for a third part public
involvements in agrarian transacting comes to agenda. That is why the third part mode has been the
most effective way to govern extension supply transactions.
Table 8 Distribution of Farmers Time between Different Operations (per cent)
Source: Personal interviews
Great part of technological development is supplied by the Agricultural Cooperative as an joint
ownership mode for organization of complex transactions. According to the Cooperative management
their extension service is used mainly by members rather to serve market. Since high asset specificity
conditions to members imply, the internal mode comes up to be the most effective way for
transacting. In many cases close collaboration between Cooperatives and Extension offices is
practiced. While forth fifth of interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo use public extension service, it is
usually very rare. As one of the farmer points out "once or less a year"..Most frequently this is for
soil and disease tests, market information and marketing preparations, or "when extension officers
come to the farm". However, main part of extension service is reported to come through interlinked
mode with input supply transactions. All business farmers report that private merchants supply them
with all important knowledge and information for free. Bilateral mode with strong interlinked
character comes up to be the most effective way for the extension supply of questioned farms.
Modem technological development in agriculture is characterized'*,ith increasing involvement
of private capital in all its stages. Along with introduction of property rights on intellectual agrarian
products and extending of possibilities to enforce those rights, the role of private modes for
transacting in research and development becomes bigger. That is why market and direct private forms
for organization of extension supply are dominant for questioned business farms. Besides that
relationships between public, cooperative and private sectors develop both in terms of competition as
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well as complementary with each other. As e a result new hybrid forms for organizations of extension
supply for farming emerge and they involve public, local, cooperative and private agents.
All interviewed farms in Nakatsubo have some insurance supply transactions. Most of
interviewed (89%) get it for paddy, one third of farms make insurance for cabbage, 44% of them
insure buildings, and only the Agrocorporation has employers insured. Extend b inter farm
organization of insurance depends on risk aversion of farmer. When risk is too big for individuals
they develop special organization to share the risk. In the most of the cases insurance supply
transactions is organized by farm cooperatives. Since risk for failure of farm production is high,
intemal fioint ownership) mode is the most appropriate from of risk sharing. In some cases the reason
for own farmers organizalion could be missing market for such services. One of interviewed farmers
points out as reason to choose the Cooperative for insurance supply that "only coop comes". For
paddy cultivation insurance supply is mandatory and farmers do not have freedom to chose
transacting mode or partners. Since membership in this organization is obliged it has character of
public organization. Free riding in insurance transactions is not a problem since rice production is
closely monitored and regulated by authority. That is an example for a third part public involvement in
insurance supply transactions. Since transaction costs for internal organization of many small
producers would be very high, the third part involvement mode develops as a substitute for private
organization. Only the Agrocorporation contracts service on risk market (with Insurance company).
Reason is that "cooperative service is not professional". Reported cooperative delay of policy
payment is not acceptabie for this large scale operations. That is why the Manager chooses
professionalist service (specialized company) to organize this very critical for his cash flow
transacting.
Since crop tends to have character of specific assets for big and highly specialized farmers they
tend to insure crop as well. In our sample as much as 29% of full time farmers insure chinese
cabbage. Through this mode they can extend size of farm transactions exploring economy of scale for
specialized production with minimum transacting risk. Illses for small farms are not so big in the case
of crop failure. Some of them practice very traditional forms for risk minimizing as diversification of
the production. That is why they do not use outside supply for crop insurance service. In the same
rn'ay farmer bears the risk for crop failure, hired labor take the risk for its insurance. Thus all farming
risk is shared internally by participants in transacting and no outside insurance supply is carry out.
However, the bigger farm size the bigger risk for failures. Therefore, the importance of risk sharing
through joint ownership (e.g.cooperative) or outside (market) modes is increasing. Possibility for
labor injuries in a large scale and labor intensive operations is very high. In order to avoid this risk the
Agrocorporation uses insurance supplying mode even for employed workers.
In the insurance markets information asymmetry and risk for opportunistic behavior are very
high. That is why insurance supplying agents always use detailed written specifications of contract
terms. Also no questioned farmer reports negotiation of insurance premium or policy. Competition in
rural insurance market intensifies very much both in term of provided service and insurance policy
(price). Cooperatives are also involving in this competition to keep business with members and to get
new (outside) customers as well. That is why profit making in insurance activity is important policy
for the local Cooperative management. This also means that market transacting for insurance supply is
becoming increasingly more effective for farmers. Framers need less a special organization to carry
out this transaction since they can get it (transfer to) cheap through market mode. On the other hand
size of the Cooperative involvements in insurance supply transactions (its market share) is heavily
depends on its ability (flexibility) to provide high quality and low costs service through market mode.
This tendency is also based on decreasing the share of full time farmers in the cooperatives. Big
number of part time farms less depend on agriculture and their main interests are quire different.
Therefore, less transacting specificity of assets in insurance activity to farming and increasing their
universal character (open to market) come as a result of this development. That is u,hy instead of
members demands profit making is crucial for development of the cooperative insurance business.
Fundamental changes have been in place for agrarian input supply transactions for last
decades. In Yachio machi there were only 0.07 tractors per farm.and 0.07 per ha in 1960. Thirty
years later the number of tractors gets to 1.1 per farm and 0.99 per ha. While more than 8O7o of aJl
tractors were manual in 1960 more than a half of them are bigger than 15 hp now. Since a tractor is a
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lighly _specific a-sgej for farm, frequency of its use is high, and no lease market for tractors exists,internal (ownership) mode is common for this transacting. In 1990 more than 77% of farms own
tractors. Joint ownership form is les,s preferred since its high level of transaction costs. It is used only
when trade off with economy of scale could be explore. Irss than LTo of tractors in Yachio machi are
owned by groups while more than 8070 of them ere bigger than 15 hp. Average number of other
rgqqttqt for farms__equipments like rice transplanters,-Chemical spreaders anddryers is also big
Gubl" q). Tirnq of effective use of those tools is very short but their timely supply is extremely critica-ifor the p-roduction- Those inputs get high transacting specific character and -ownership mode u,hich
assume full control on transactions by farmers is chosen.

















In Nakatsubo hamlet the number of tractors per farm and per farmland is smaller than in the
city accordingly 0.96 and 0.66. That is a result of bigger farm size and better exploration of economy
of scale in the hamlet comparing to Yachio machi. Most of the farmers in the hamlet have their own
tracts for transportation of vegetables to markets. One third of tract are 4t and all other 2t.
While much of inputs used to be produced on farm there are specialized economic activities
now. In these conditions joint ownership or market modes are used to organize inputs supply
transacting. Agricultural cooperative is a main supplier of big part of long term and short term infritd.
According to the manager of the local Cooperative the full time farmers are their main customer^s for
lnputs. Next come part time farms, non farmers and other clients. Since non farm inputs supply forfarming incteases, transactions become more (farm) universal and market (rathef than inlernal)
organization takes dominant share of all transactions. In Nakatsubo hamlet less than 5070 of the
fefiilizer and chemical supply is through the Cooperative. Since vegetable producers use a great
amount of fertilizers and chemicals the hamlet is important for private dealers. While in all Yachio
machi 10 dealers compete with the Cooperative in Nakatsubo alone their number is 6. Price
competition becomes important part of the Cooperative policy. Same price level is applied both for
members and nonmembers. Cooperative employers visit every farms and advertise-products and
prices. When it is necessary they make discount below dealers offers. Also three diffeient levels of
prices_ftx inputs are applied: spot, planed, business. When farmers make advance orders they get
s_pecial discounts or when they buy in big quantity they receive gift cars. According to the
Cooperative officials in the past dealers prices were lower than the Cooperatives. Hbwever,
nowadays merchants arrange their prices after the Cooperative.
Each branch of the Cooperative has direct relationships with the Federation of Cooperatives.
Besides all branches have freedom to choose partners and to negotiate prices. This mode allbws local
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managers to adjust their operations using economy of scale of joint transactions according to the local
and Federation interests or switching to direct market inputs supply. Local managerc can use other
suppliers but in this Cooperative inputs supply is mainly through the Federation. According to the
officials as much as 907a of inputs supply is from the Federation. President of the Federation is also
the President of the local Cooperative. Therefore, not comparative efficiency of transacting modes
but personal influence of the President is important in choosing the partner. While in principle prices
with Federation could be negotiated actually fixed prices of inputs are used.
Among interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo hamlet 787o use the Cooperative for some kinds of
inputs supply. Most of the farmers use several suppliers for chemicals and fertilizers. They either get
different products from various merchants or divide orders between different suppliers. In 567o of
farms some interlinked mode is reported. For all part time farmers that interlinked is with paddy
marketing. Several farmers from the hamlet produce melon under special technology. Technology has
been designed by Hamlet I-nader, who also supplies specially developed fertilizers, and markets the
brand name products through the Post Office system.
In one third of the cases negotiation of prices is practiced. All intervieu'ed farmers point out
that the Cooperative prices are fixed and higher than merchants. Negotiation takes place only rnith
private dealers and according to one of the farmers "when vegetable prices go down the merchant but
the cooperative makes discount on inputs prices". All of questioned farmers pay for current input
supply only twice a yeat. Thus all short term inputs supply modes are characlerized rvith partial
interlinked with current capital suppiy by partners. Otherwise farmers u,ould have faced the need to
increase capital supply transactions (invest more capital) to support current input supply and farm
SIZE.
Only the Agrocorporation reports having only one supplier for all fertilizers and chemicals. In
order to coordinate inputs supply for the big farm operations a private dealer visits the
Agrocorporation oflice 4 times a week. Dealer also arranges land for lease in and supply other
information (for available labor, markets etc). Despite the big amount of transacting and possibility to
negotiate prices the Manager of the Agrocorporation does not do so. This is because he gets for free
(save on transacting costs for) other services through this interlinked form of transacting.
A11 farmers have got a long term relationships with same partners. One third of interviewed
farmers put as a problem in input supply transacting the "big number of dealers". Apparently increase
of the number of suppliers save on prices but costs for selection of the best partner go up. When
intensity of inputs supply is very high (big operation size) the stable form of transacting develops to
economize on transacting costs. In the Agrocorporation where frequency and amount of transacting is
very high market mode would have been very expensive to use. That is why the inputs supply is
practically integrated in the corporation structure through a long term interlinked mode.
All of interviewed farmers buy long term inputs from private companies. Prices usually are
negotiated. Long term business retrationships are registered in all cases. Guarantees by makers are
broadly used to save on transacting costs in highly competitive market for farm machinery. Hou,ever,
in the market for used machinery some transacting difficulties are reported. According to the Manager
the Cooperative has registered some quality disputes for its second hand machinery supply. Among
interviewed farmers in one third of the cases input supply disputes are reported. They are connected
with efficiency of supplied chemicals, quality of materials (e.g.venae sheet tunnel) etc. Only one
among interviewed farmers report using inputs through the Cooperativd organizalion. This is for a
short days lease of a dam track based on written contracts with the Cooperative.
In Nakatsubo hamlet there is a non formal farm organization for part of input supply
transactions. So called Vegetable Study Group has been established by 20 farmers in order to stop
soil and decease problems through manure use. Alrnost all full time farmers are members of the group
u,ith equal share in the assets (tractor, manure spreader, building). Activity of the group is
coordinated by 7 members committee. Hamlet Irader (non farmer) serves as the Secretary of the
group and keeps records, coliects money, helps farmers to find manure etc. Maintenance of facilities
is on the base of fees (half or full day) and labor supplied by the members. Depreciation is not
recorded and replacement of assets is through collecting of necessary capital. Organizatron is strongly
members oriented and non members can not use groups facility. . Farmers explore jointly economy of
capital costs through this organization.Most of the farmers use the groups tractor and equipment3-4
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days a year. According to the Irader of the Group farmers in the hamlet intend to keep this
organization. However, no extension of groups activities is discussed. Simple character of
transactions and strong informal relationships in the neighborhood make coordination costs of this
mode close to zero. Potential of self enforcement of transactions is very high. Howevet, some
transaction costs associated with free riding is reported. They find expression in some cleaning up
disputes and faster than in the private farms depreciation of the common machinery.
Capital supply transactions of intewiewed farms in Nakatsubo are organized mainly through
internal mode (self financing). Only the Agrocorporation reports to use short term credit and 4470 of
farms have long term credits. Only full time farms use outside capital supply mode. I-argest part of
farmers (60%) use the Cooperative to carry out capital supply transactions. Lorn' interest rate or
availabiliiy of preferential loan are reported as reasons to chose the Cooperative bank. Hou,ever, big
business farms tend to use corlmercial banks. All of them point out the professionaiism as the reason
to chose bank. Farmers usually use all time the same partners to borrow money. In one fifth of the
cases (land) collateral in used. Farmers have got own Prefectural and National organizations to
guarantee their loans. Agrocorporation alone reports that negotiation on interests rate is practiced.
There are many Government Programs for promotion of agriculture in Japan. Interested
farmers can easily get preferential loans. Most of the public funds for those programs are managed by
the Cooperatives. While commercial banks also can supply credit under the Government Programs
our survey shows that it is not always known by farmers. These large promotion programs ar€
examples for a third part public involvements in agrarian credit supply transactions. I-ack of this
public intervention in capital supply transactions could have deformed substantially development of
ihe farming structure. Besides the Cooperative bank is one of the world largest banks with broad
spectrum of financial operations (including overseas transactions). Cooperative members can easily
get various (production, consumption) credits trough this joint ownership mode. That is why most of
the questioned farmers (78V0) report they have no problems to get any amount of capital they want to
extend their farm operations. Agrocorporation is eager to use preferential (Government) long term
credit but it is not eligible since the company is not formerly registered for farming.
Marketing transactions are very important for a great number of farms in Yachio machi. Most
of the farms are involved in some kind of marketing transacting. However, the extend of this
involvement varies significantly for different farm products (Table L0). Besides share of farms which
produce various farm products is quite different from the share of marketed farms for those products.
It means that some specialization and exchange take place. Howevet, since the share of most of the
products in total farm output is not significant, marketing transactions for such products are with local
importance only. Moreover in r:ural area it is still common for many households to take part in
agianan transacting (farm production) in order to supply farm products through internal or non
market modes. Size of farm transactions in such cases is not determined by efficiency but from non
economic factors. Those farms do farming not as a specialized market activity but for ou'n direct
consumption or for traditional exchange (barter) of farm products, or for non economic transacting
(e.g.gift for relatives and friends).
While tobacco, burley and wet rice have the biggest commercialization among all farm
products, the greatest share in all marketing transactions is for chinese cabbage, rice, melon and
^cabbage. Biggest part of farm transacting is connected with production of those products and their
share in cultivated area, total production and income is the biggest. Chinese cabbage accounts for
707o of production and sold out vegetables, and it has 947o of products marketed. Share of melon in
total veg-etable production and sold out products is 167o, and marketed ratio is high QaTo).
?otential to increase farm size through internal consumption of farm products
(e.g.processing, production of feed for animals) is not very big. "Make ot buy" decision in farming.is
almost always-irr favor of product specialization of farm. That is because of the mass commodity
character ol farm products and discussed high costs of internal mode of agrarian transactions.
Consequently orgaiization of marketing transactions gives up the biggest number of various off farm
modes 
-of 
transacting. Actually all attention of managers (and scholars) was initially put in studying
transacting difficult-ies and developing modes to overcome 'these difficulties for marketing
transactions.
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Table L0 Market Transactions for Different Farm Products in Yachio Machi
for 1990 (per cent)
Source: Census data
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All among interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo hamlet produce rice and 78Vo of. them market
rice. Only two big farms cultivate paddy for their own consumption. Most of rice is marketed through
private contract modes (Table 1L). Usually farms have got a long term (several generations)
transacting with their partners. For all part time farmers and one third of business farms interlinked
mode with fertilizer supply is reported. One of the full time farmers has a contract to supply a special
rice variety (Kosihikari) to a restaurant. Only part of rice marketing transactions is organized through
the Cooperative. One of questioned farmers present as a reason to chose this form the request from
his relative who works for the Cooperative. Another full time farmers market only a part of its paddy
to the Cooperative in order to pay sirpplied fertilizers and chemicals. Share of illelaly marketed rice i.s
not big for questioned farmers. Rice income through different modes is the same and guaranteed by
the third party (Government). No significant differences between the Cooperative and contract prices
for rice are reported. Therefore, some transacting benefits rather than income opportunities are
reasons for farmers to chose one or another form. It is not accidental that almost in all cases the
interlinked character of marketing mode with organization of other kind of transacting is in place.
Table 11 Share of Various Modes for Marketing Transactions (per cent)
Indicators Business farms Part time farms
Rice
Share of farms producing











Chinese cabbage & cabbage
Share of farms producing















Share of farms producing









A1l full time farms produce chinese cabbage and some of them cabbage. All of them use
wholesale markets for marketing of those vegetables. One fifth of business farms use both market and
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contract modes for transacting. However, importance of those mode for different farms is not same.
OnIy 2% of 500 million sells of the Agrocorporation is carried out on wholesale market. Practically all
market transacting is through contract mode rvith 23 partners (companies, supermarkets, processors).
Capacity of the individual partners of the Agrocorporation are smaller tharrits production potential.
That is why the Manager was introduced by his first partner to new contragents. Since frequency and
volume of transacting are high all parties are interested in carrying out transactions smoothly. Besides
the long term contract mode gives transacting sides opportunity to adjust production and delivery
plans, to overcome disputes etc. Therefore, costs for contracting and carrying out transactions in such
alarge scale are not big for either parties.
Two business farm use the Cooperative organization to market their chinese cabbage. One of
them sells the biggest part of his output through the Cooperative because of already mentioned request
by a relative. Contract is written with every 10 days specification of quantity of marketing products.
Prices are not fixed but to the some extent they are guaranteed under a special Government scheme.
Another farmer does prefer market mode but he still uses the Cooperative for spring cabbage
marketing. That is because of interlinked organization of marketing transactions u'ith service supply
by the Cooperative. Since farmers does not have resources (time) for critical clean up operations and
for preparing vegetables for marketing he chooses the interlinked mode. One case of contract failure
with the Cooperative is reported. Because of high market price of the chinese cabbage one of
questioned farmers did not meet his contract obligation to sell through the Cooperative. No any fine is
reported since the fioint) ownership mode is more important then current use contract. However, next
year only farmers who completed their previous contracts get transplanting service (for chinese
cabbage) from the Cooperative at a half price. Thus tendency of strong interlinked character of
marketing transactions through the Cooperative mode exists.
Great part of full time farmers produce melon (5770) and all of them use u,holesale market
mode only for transacting. Only a half of questioned part time farms produce vegetables and melon.
They prefer wholesale markets to carry out marketing transactions. While business operators look for
best markets and they tend to market a large part of vegetables in big wholesale markets, part time
farms use local collecting markets. According to an oid part time farmer he prefers the local market
despite lower price level. That is because it is very close to his farm and company employers help him
to unload his products.
One of such local collecting markets (in Chiokava) serves 250-300 farmers. For almost thirty
years this private company collects farm products and sale them through other modes (wholesale
markets, supermarkets etc) as main business activities. According to the company staff 60-70% of
farmers in Ango region (which includes Nakatsubo hamlet) and a half of full time farms use this
market. Accordingly 30-4070 of farms probably sell all their output here. Most of farmers bring
themselves farm products to market facility. Only for 57o mostly aged farmers output is collected by
company. Usually prices are not announced and any products are accepted. However, u,hen company
needs more products it announces price level to altract more farmers. Also when whether is not good
(e.g.heavy rain) company staff ask some farmers to market there. According to the company
employer they do not have any problem marketing chinese cabbage since no big quality differences of
products exists. However, for melon marketing big quality differences are a problem. In order to
improve products quality this Collecting market organizes joint seminars for farmers with a Seed
company. Hou,ever, even when quality is not very high the Company glves a good price otherwise
farmers would easily move to other markets. One of interviewed full time farmers, who markets his
vegetables both in wholesale and local markets, points out that price levels are almost the same.
According to the Irader of the Nakatsubo hamlet more than 807o of the farmers market directly
their chinese cabbage in Tokyo wholesale market. Half of the melon is marketed in local market and
another half in Prefectural wholesale markets.
Mainly full time farmers use the cooperative form for vegetable marketing. According to data
from the local branch farmers in Nakatsubo do not market through the Cooperative too much (Table
L2). One of the reasons is that there are several wholesale markets in the area. Since commission of
the Cooperative of 7-87o is twice as much as in the wholesale markets, farmers simply use cheaper
mode. Despite that according to the branch staff good quality melons come to the Cooperative and bad
ones are marketed through other modes. Another reason is that the Cooperative collects melon only
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from their own seeds. However, most of the farmers prefer low sugar grade but much resistance to
deceases varieties. Coordination of marketing transactions by the Cooperative is done through farm
and plot level plans for every 1-0 days of the season. In order to increase sugar degree the Cooperative
staff give recommendation for starting date of harvesting. Farmers select products in groups and
Cooperative checks up every 240th box. According to the staff they have been practicing this system
successfully for the last three years. Since self enforcing potential and intra group control are very
high only few bad boxes have been found for the period.















Share of the Cooperative in paddy marketing is high and mainly part time farmers use this
transacting mode. Marketing transaCtions for rice have been strongly regulated (enforced) by.lhe
Government in order to guarantee farmers income. Transacting costs of better mzrketing opportunities
are extraordinary big comparing to possible extra income or opportunity costs of part time farmers.
For their low marketing level (small paddy operation) those extra transacting costs (and efforts) are
not justified. That is why most of the part time farmers use the cheap cooperative transacting mode
instead of looking for best marketing of rice.
I-ocal Cooperative does not take any commission and all margin goes to the Federation. Prices
are not negotiated and income is pooled among different branches. Cooperative does not take
ownership bn marketed products. In order to improve marketing strategy the- Cooperative promotes
hamlet level farms oryaiizations. There are two such clubs in Nakatsubo for melon and cabbage
producers. Only members use the cooperative mode and income transfer rather than profit making is
important for ihe organization. Accoiding to the Manager.to keep market share and to increase
transferred income to the members are the most important poiicy issues for the Cooperative marketing
activity. Size of this form for organization of marketing transactions depends heavily-on malagement
ability- to do business with mernbers. Only way to do so is to extend variety of supplgmentary
marketing services and to make them cheaper comparing to other transacting modes,. Otheru'ise
farmers ir,,ould easily switch to more effectlve marketing mode. None of interviewed farmers in
Nakatsubo hamlet reports having problems in marketing their products.
There is one -5 members marketing organization with a participant from Nakatsubo hamlet.
Farmers use a joint contract mode for organization of their marketing transactions for lettuce, cabbage
and leak. Fixed prices for all year are contracted with adjustments according to market levels. Farmers
negotiate quantitl' and time oi delivery with partners (supermarket,-processing company, merchant).
If they produce more but there is not demand in partners they earth up. extra. products. Farmers usejoint inirketing organization to save on transacting costs. of. negotiation, linding partners, secure
marketing, and adjust production. Costs for internal coordinatiols are not big since the small size of
the group- and limiied area of internal organization of (marketing) transactions. On the other hand for
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their partners freshness of products and time of delivery are very important. Since frequency of
transacting between same partners is high both sides have incentives to develop stable private mode of
transacting in order to save on costs of their exchange. L.ong term contract form allows them to make
easy quantity and delivery adjustments. Also both sides realize all potential of the highly transacting
specific assets (freshness of products) through this form. That is why the long term private mode for
integration comes up to be more effective way of organization of marketing transacting.
- There is another interlinked private mode for marketing transactions in the hamlet. Several
farmers produce melon under the special technology and organic fertilizers developed by lhe lrader
of the Hamlet. He selects products for special price and markets them as brand name through the Post
office catalog sale. Througir this mode input supply and marketing are integrated by the Hamlet leader
around a Brand name capital. In this way Hamlet l-eader realizes the extra rent of the brand name
melon (and 5 years inveslments to develop it) approaching interested ciients. This brand name is an
asset with high specificity and a special mode is necessary to carry out transactions supported by it.
Long term contratt mode with producers is the form which secure control on quality and save costs
for training on special technology. Further integration (internal mode) is not necessary since
transactions are for limited time of year (one season), special transacting investments from farmers are
not required, and uncertainty of transacting is low. For interested consumers this brand name melons
have a special value (different product) in their utility and preferences function. That is rn hy they
chose the form of direct ordering to get this special quality which can not be suppiies through market
mode of standardized products. Guarantee on advertised quality and location given by the Hamlet
lrader plays a role of additional transacting minimizing device. Diversification and changes in
individu-al consumers preferences prevent further tntemalualion of marketing transactions. Through
this direct marketing annually 800 clients get brand name melons. Howevet, according to supplier
less th.m L07o of clients are constant. Hamlet l-nader could keep all his client through integral mode of
marketing transacting (like consumer club for instance) but he has to develop all class of various
organic products. However, to organize supply of all class such brand name products (which also
would require internal mode) would be transacting costly and economy of specialization would be
hardly reached. That is why through this non market mode transactions between producers and final
consumers are effectively integrated around a brand name capital. Form of marketing of brand name
agraian products is an effective way to organize transactions in highly competitive markets for fruits
and vegetables. However, because of the high asset specificity for both producers and consumer
sides, possibility for opportunism, less frequency and uncertainty, a special private mode is necessary
to carry out transactions effectively. There are plenty of examples for such marketing and interlinked
organizations which replace traditional market modes. Widespread distribution of customers clubs
and cooperatives, brand names, pick you up yourself, farm tourism etc give some transaction costs
minimizing prospects of organizational development in Japanese agriculture.
Transaction Costs and Prospects for Organizational Development in
Agriculture
Organizational development of the Japanese agriculture depends on many factors. One of the
most important is the transaciion costs minimizing reason. It is impossible to measure the level of total
costs foi agraian transacting. However, we can get an idea about the transaction costs from the
distribution of the time for management of farm and farm organizations. We also can examine various
factors responsible for the agrarian transaction costs differences. l-ast but not at least we could study
out the costs minimizing potential of various modes for organization of transactions, In this way we
can predict what kind of organizational forms for different transacting most li\e_lf will develop.^ In modern agriculture management takes a major portion of the time of farmers. Our survey in
Nakatsubo hamlet shou's that377o of the total time of interviewed farmers is devoted for management
(Table L3). However, various kind of farmers spend quite differenl p1fr-.of_their time for main
management functions. Efforts for current management accounts for only 1,57o of the time of part time
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farms and no time is spent for strategic management. On the other extreme is the M11ag-er.of the
Agrocorporation who aflocates three torth of hii time for management activities and a half of his total
tfre is ior strategic management. Therefore, the management cost-s depends on the size of farm
transactions. I-arfer the siZe of farm transactions bigger the costs for management and greater the
share of time spent for strategic management.
Table 13 Distribution of Total Farmers Time (per cent)
Functions Agrocorporation Business farmers Part time farmers All group

















Besides technological management the total time of a farm manager consists of direct efforts
(costs) for organization df agtanan lransacting. Definitely production mana_gement could b.e very high
in agriculture"since its big dJpendance from climatic factorl and ne_cessity f9r'ipSrmanent" manager's
atteition. As a matter 5t tict more than 557o of questioned farmers in Nakatsubo report that
production management takes a high or moderate level in their current management efforts. However,
'aside of this direEt production maiagement all other management functions are connected with some
kind of transactions'. They could be iranagement of inter farm transactions for organization, direction,
and supervision of family or (and) hired labor. Most frequently that is for.management of outside
farm gate transacting wiih maiket agents and organizations. Accordingly the transacting costs for
i"putr" supply, marfeting, participdiion in organizations etc could be quite a 
_big part of total
m'uttug"-int 
-costs. Xamjly itris management oT internal and outside transacting charucterizes to the
great Extent farming as a business. Consequently approaching the farm management as manageryenJ
6f 1fu.-"t,s) transictions with other indivi^duals-must be the main object of tlie economic analysis. It
is riot accidental that business farms spend more time for management since the intensity and amount
of transactions, and hence the costs foi organization of transacting, are also big.
In the structure of current manageirent costs the level of transacting costs to hire labor and for
labor supervision, to find suppliers forinputs 1qd for mg1_k9!ing lf &1m output, and lor contracting,
"i" uig & -od"rut" for one riittr 
of interviewed farmers (Table 14.;..stiare of the full time farms with
frigfr Jffott.s for input supply and marketing transacting.is especially latge.. For the Manager of the
tE 
"."tdration iunent'tiairsacting 
costs lre not so fiigtr. ttrat is a result of.specially developed
i;t'";"f;d"tut" laiuirion managet!1 to suu" on interfarm costs of transacting. Since number of hired
i"uoi ii big it wodld have been v"ery 'costly (or impossible) for the Manager to extend farm size trough
labor suppiy transactions in such a large scale. He develops a sp^ecial farm management structure to
".ono*ir" on costs for internal 




are through specially designld private (costs minimizing) modes with partners. For the
Munug"r it is"very impoftani to develop modes^ to economize on costs of transacting such as long term
contricts since ihe ievel of transacting is great. Much of his total time is. spent on strategic
-"r"g"*""t, and designing and develiping 6f tr"* folms for transacting are-important. part of it.A"*."Ahg to the Ma#ger"to find out ^ma-nag"ment class labor ,takes ? good part of his .current
*utrug"-?trt efforts. SJme of the questioned-full time farmers spend a lot.of management time for
i""rti?"r closely connected with farm transactions like book keeping, preparing tax documents etc.
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Structure of the costs for organization of inputs supply depends on the farm size. Share of
farmers which speq'l trig1l or moderate time for finding the best suppliers of all kinds of farm inputs is
large (Table 15). Full time farms are heavily involved in input.s- supply transactions and level of
transacting^costs.associated with inputs supply is much biggei for ifiii group. According to the
Manager oJ th9 Agrocorporation 
,he is "engage finding out good labor every 
- 
day" . For non labor
input supply. of the Agrocorporation efforts level is not high since special bilaterai cost economizing
modes have been developed.
Table 14 Efforts for Current Management of Farms (per cent)

































































High other tasks 100 16.7 22.2
Source: Personal interviews
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Table L5 Time Devoted to Find Best Suppliers of Inputs (per cent)
Kind of inputs Efforts level Agrocorporation Business
farmers



















































































I-evel of interfarm costs of transacting depends on labor supply transactions trough
employment or daily based hiring modes. Only one fifth of questioned farmers in Nakatsubo report
that their time for "supewision of hired labor is high" while for the most of participants in labor
supply transactions this time is low or none. That is a result of relatively low level of non family labor
supply for critical farm operations, long term relationships between partners, and broad use of output
based compensation for hired labor.
Farmers participation in various organizations gives an idea about altemative modes for
minimizing on intrafarm or market forms of transacting. Participation in outside organization must
have some transacting advantages for farms. Otherwise farmers would not cany out transactions
through an organization. Shift to outside mode relatively increases farmers costs for participation and
transacting through these organizations. However, total costs for agrarian transacting have to be
lower. When organization is not very big then internal costs for coordination, decision making and
incentive structure are negligible. A1l interviewed leaders of the farm groups in Abashiri, Nagano and
Yachio machi areas point out that coordination costs are very low and no transaction difficulty of
these modes exists. According to the l,eader of a farm group in Sapporo area his job is to make plans
and to adjust individual plans. This takes only a limited time and management efforts. Members of the
group change leadership on rotated base every year and they do not expect any compensation for
leadership job.
Big organizations like cooperatives, colporation etc have their own internal costs of
transacting. According to the Manager of the Yachio Machi Cooperative his biggest efforts in total
management time are for dealing with members and other tasks which are specified as coordination
between Directors (Table16). Sometimes internal coordination and incentive costs in an organization
could be so big that it would make transaction advantages trough it close to zero. This put at new level
the problem for developing incentive, control and transacting minimizing structures for such complex
organizations of farm transactions. That is why strategic management takes high time of the Managers
effort in Yachio coop and it is closely connected with overall organizational development,
improvement of the internal structure and incentive system.
Table 16 Distribution of Management Efforts in Agricultural Cooperatives
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All of interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo but the Agrocorporation are members of the
Agricultural Cooperative. Farmers usually have got membership from previous generations. Only
l27o of them report participating in some kind of management of the Cooperative. Biggest part of
members (85%) point out that they have no influence on organizational policy and only 777o of the
full time farmers ieport a moderate influence on the Cooperative policy. According to the two third of
business farms the Cooperative service is moderate to members. However, only a half of part time
farmers describe the Cooperative service as moderate while another half evaluate it as lou, for
members. For one of interviewed part time farmers "cooperative is the same like merchants". One of
questioned business farmer never attends the general meetings of the Cooperative. Surprisingly for
good managers none of the questioned farmers knows what his cooperative shares are.
Moit of the questioned farmers 66qo) are members of some king of farm organizalion
different from the Cooperative. While none of part time farmers and Agrocorporation participate in
farm organizations, the organizational involvement of full time farmers in joint modes is as high as
837o. As much as 600/o of the members report that they participate in management of organizations
actively and their influence on the organizational policy is high. All of them point out that those
organizations provide high service to members. Therefore, business farms tend to use special
organizations to govern part of their transactions and they find this participation effective. For part
time farms it is more economical to use the Cooperative or bilateral modes for transacting.
Agrocorporation carries out a big part of outside transactions through its own bilateral forms.
- Half of interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo used to be members of some farm organizations.
All of part time farms and a half of business farms took part tn organizations for marketing
transactlons. For another haif of full time farmers it was organization for service supply transacting.
A11 those organuations disappeared and that is pointed out by all farmers as a reason to quite
membership. Joint ownership modes is easy to develop, manage and quite. When it becomes
unnecessary or too expensive for transacting it is replaced by new mode of organization. As soon as
all farms in the hamlet have internalized tractors and tracks supply transactions previous common
machinery use organizations sloped to exist.
Small farm organizations are strongly members oriented and individuals influence to the great
extend organizational development and policy. Cooperative has its own organizational policy and
development, and they are not always members oriented. As our survey in Nakatsubo shows time
for participation in organizations is low or none for all members. For small private organizations that
is because of little costs for coordinating of transactions through those specialized modes. Transaction
costs for organizational setting up, for current management, and liquidation qre low. Big
organizalions like cooperatives have their own management structure and substantial intemal costs.
Because of the big transaction level, asymmetry of information, opportunism etc sometime it comes
up to be difficult Tor members to manage their own organization. That is why, they start to feel the
cooperative not as an ownership mode but only as an altemative to other form of transacting. 
_^ When farmers in Nakatsubo have been asked about the role of different factors for their
decision making all of them put high weights on their own experience (Table 17). For the most of
questioned farmers the role oT long term partners and market prices is b1S. For some farms friends
znd lending institutions have a subitantial role to play. However, fot all interviewed farmers the role
of the Government policy, local authority, hamlet, Cooperative and other membership organizations,
leading farmers in ihe area, extension office and private consultants, is ,small or none. A1l those
confirm that intrafarm organization, market, and long term (in many cases interlinked) modes zre the
most important for the organization of agraian transactions, That is why we.can expect that.private
and market rather than joint ownership or public (third part involvement) modes will be dominant in
future or ganization of transacting.
As far as future plans are concerned more than 7t7o of interviewed full time farmers in
Nakatsubo hamlet intend to extend farm size. All of them have plans for some new form for
organizalion of transacting. Changes of inputs supply, develo-ping_ of greenhouse^ p^roduction and
processing, new organizalion of marketing are intended modes for extension of farm size. All
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questioned farmers plan to increase farm size through introducing contract or other special mode for
direct marke_ting. One of the farmers intends to joint the big farmeis-consumers organuation for direct
marketing of chemical free. products in Tsukuba area. One out of four farmers plan to develop some
processing operations. This means that the farm size will increase through internal organization of
previous marketing transactions (intrafarm production consumption), associated extension of inputs
supply transacting, and through marketing of new value added products. As much as 297i of
business farms point out that the lack of family labor limits further eitension of farms size. The same
share of full time farmers want to use labor employment contract for extension of farm size but find it
difficult. Some of them prefer to have only japanese workers on year base contract but report that they
are not available. Part time farmers have no plans to increase size of farm transactions.
_ technological development have changed substantially structure of agrarian transacting and
modes for their organization. Improvements in technology and labor productivity increase
enormously farmers capacity to manage large farm transactions at low costs. Standardization of farm
op_erations make it possible to control and carry out a large scale internal transactions effectively. Both
efficiency to supervise farm labor and capacity to manage more labor increase. Standardization of
technoklgical operations extends the possibility to use output based compensation for hired labor or to
contract them as a service supply. Automatization and computerization replace many critical farm
operations with sophisticated technical systems (e.g.automatiC water control supply in-greenhouses).
Extension of farm size becomes less dependant on transacting limits of hired or iervice labor. Besides
development of agrarian inputs markets brought the trzursaction costs for market procurement down.
Uncertainty of development of markets and information asymmetry for markei transactions have
fallen substantially. As.a result the opportunity to extend farm size through large scale nonfarm inputs
supply becomes very big.
Technological opportunities have increased the minimeil effective size for organization of
different farm transactions as well. In order to explore the potentiai of available technologies farmers
are to make various organization for their transacting. Accordingly the size of traditional farm
organizations (groups, cooperatives etc) for different agrarian transactions get bigger. However, it
makes the intensity of transactions under farm or group management much highei and contributes
much to the transaction costs.
Intensification of agraian transactions also has increased costs for their market coordination.
Risk from fluctuation of prices and overseas competition, and potential of recurrent transaction
between same parties, level of transactions asset interdependency, all have brought to a live various
nonmarket and private modes for organization of transactions. This costs economizing potential of
specialized governing modes contributes to the extend of transacting through various olganizations.
For instance in Abashiri a farm organizalion for machinery utilization practlces risk sharing through
pooling of income of newly introduced products. Radish is an effective product but with great
variation in prices. That is why existing organization for inputs supply traniacting is also used for
overcoming uncertainty of marketing transactions.
Frequency of transacting between same parties and their interlinked character have increased
incentives to design various formal and informal forms to save on transaction costs. Many such forms
in input supply and marketing transactions have been described in analysis of the different types of
agrartan transaction in Yachio machi.
Structures of farm transacting have become complex and organizational innovations of
industrial type emerged to minim'tze on transaction costs. Many types of integral, bilateral or
multilateral private forms have developed to facilitate transacting. Purpose of theie organizational
innovations has been to improve coordination of transactions, to increase individuals contlol on their
transacting, to introduce strong incentive of transacting parties to overcome transacting difficulties.
This changes substantially organizational structure of farm transactions. Importance of nontraditional
agrarian inputs supply transactions (land, labor) for extension of the farm size relatively has
decreased. Consequently the share of non family agricultural establishment in some agro industries
have become substantial (Table 18). While in rice, wheat and soybean production small scale and
group farms are still dominant, in cattle and greenhouse production large scale and corporate type
farms are the major producers (MAFF, 1990).
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Table 17 Role of Different Factors in Farm Decision Making (per cent)
Factors Role Agrocorporation Bus ines s
farmers
Part time farms All group
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Table 18 Share of Heads Raised by Non Family organizations (per cent)

















Source: Annual Agricultural White Paper 1990, p. I39
Extension of farms start to depend not on organization of haditional inputs supply(e.g..f1nqland) brrt on farmers abilities to introduced agrarian innovations and build tarm spe^cifib
capital. Ogawa Sachi a big.cattle producers from Kagoshima area plans to extent farm up to 1000
head per year not through hiring labor but introducing a new technolbgy. He does not u,anf to follow
the way of h-is 1elghboi through increasing of the labor supply up to 20 employers. Despite of thatbig output of 4000 heads his neighbors income is as high as of the Sachi san. Big rice farmers from
Sapporo_ area relays on family labor only. He expects his son to join the family farm. However,
farmer does not intend to increase the farm through land supply bui introducing new intensive crop
structure. Diversification of production is also seen as a way to reduce uncertainty from liberalization
of rice market.
Managers personal abilities to organize internal and outside transactions at large scale turn to
be the most important part of the farm specific assets. Namely improving skifis (technology
management) is put al th9 most important poind in individual management by farmers'(tto tWi,
p.47). As a result of this development building of farm specific iather than standardized farm
operations started to determine success of a good managei. Accordingly various new forms to
increase interfarm transacting and for direct transactions with final consumers turn to be the way to
survive in market competition with overseas products
We have visited three farms in Hokkaido which are good examples for extension of farm size
and development of inter organizational structure. Intention of the Manager of the large Corporative
C_orporation from Abashiri is to.increase the farm size through vertical integration in processing,
direct marketing in farm side shop, and agro tourism. High level of transaction costs for-hired labor
supply limits extension of farm size through labor supply mode. Moreover, uncertainty associated
rn'ith market fluctuation 
_of prices increases risk for extension of the farm size through marketing
transactions of farm products. At th9 same time freshness and time of delivery of main product (milli)
is highly transaction specific capital. That is why the Manager looks toward'to the internal mode oi
consumption- (instead_ of marketing) of row milk in order to overcome unilateral transacting
dependency from local processors demands. As a result the farm size will increase through internal
organization of large inputs supply and marketing of value added products. This mode will eliminate
the transacting risk from changes of milk prices since processed products can be keep in stock for a
long time. Also transportation costs will be much low per unit processing products and the
Corporation can get advantage of marketing opportunity nationwide. Farm has already joint the
village farm organization for direct marketing transactions.
In this Dairy Cooperation dividends are not distributed and all profit is accumulated. Since the
high farm asset specificity large dept financing organization is not always easy. Therefore, equity
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financing of the Corporation happens to be the most efficient mode to organize capital supply
transactions. Besides members of the corporation lease out their land to the company but rent level is
lower than market rate. Lnwer than market return on this resource futures the high transacting
specificity of particular land to the farm. I-and supply is in interlinked dependency with other input
supply such as dairy facilities, feed production for dairy sector etc. That is why the internal rather
than market mode for land supply happens to be most the appropriate - owners of the corporation
lease in for themselves. Moreover the corporative form of transacting allows internal redistribution of
income and direct links between personal performance and income level. l,ow rent level is also
important part of designed incentive structure since this is a way to reduce gap in income of
participants in the organization. Special mode for increasing the size of the Corporation through labor
supply is also applied. New members are recruit nationwide through adds and 5 years testing period
for new comers before accepting them as members is practiced.
In a big dairy farm in Obihiro one third of profit is kept in the Corporation, one third is
distributed among owners-managers, and employers get one third as bonus. Half of bonuses have to
be invested in the corporation at equal to the cooperative interest rate. Since the big size of intemal
transacting and their interdependency individual incentives are connected with overall performance of
the organization. In order to overcome opportunism and difficulties to measure individuals
contributions employers also share investments and profit of corporate activities. Therefore, equity
and internal (employers) financing mode is effectively used for capital supply with high farm
specificity. In order to minimize on transaction costs for labor supply a three months testing period is
applies before to get regular employment contract.
There are two section in an Abashiri farm group: for machinery utilization and for common
farming. Income from joint farming section is used to buy new machineries. Again equity financing
interlinked with inputs supply transactions (joint production) has developed as an effective u'ay for
organization of capital supply. In order to improve coordinations of the interlinked transactions
between two sections previous separate management structure has been replaced by unified
management.
Modern technological development also substantially revolutionalizes forms for organization
of transactions and increases efficiency of nern' transacting modes. Improvement in information,
communication and transportation systems makes it cheap to transact directly at national inputs supply
and output markets. Widespread mobiphons introduction for instance make it possible for a farmer to
order needed chemicals (or buy shares at Tokyo stock exchange) from his paddy field. Inputs are
delivered fast and cheap to the farm spots by market agents without any need of special organization.
Many farmers have on line information about markets, prices, farm innovations, and other important
data. In this way some cherry tomatoes producers from Kyushu follow whether forecast for Tokyo
area in order to adjust their shipment plans (JAN 7996, p.a). If rain is expected in Chiba prefecture
and therefore hawest would be delayed, Kyushu farmers increase temperature in their greenhouses to
accelerate shipment. In this way they can avoid competition with Chiba farmers and get high prices in
the capital markets.
Recent introduction of internet in farms decreases costs for direct nationwide marketing to
final consumers practically to zero. This invention reduces dramatically information asymmetry at all
stages of canying out transactions. All current information on product specification, supply,
demands, prices etc can be exchange on line at low costs. This makes trailsacting fast and effective as
in ideal market. Also enforcement costs are dramatically reduced since information about cheating
could be effectively distributed among all participants in transactions.
Computerization also gives farmers unlimited opportunity to exchange ideas on technology
innovation, business plans etc. They can easily set up electronic network organizations and explore
fully the potentiai in large transacting at very low costs.
Products and technology standardization have been only one direction of the development. As
income level emd consumer preferences develop competition with non standardized fzrm products
becomes increasingly important. Besides development of technoiogies for transportation and
presewation of freshness of farm products overcomes limits of ovelseas agents to compete on internal
markets. Needs to produce for niche markets, and special consumers, and to meet particular
demands, bring to a live new forms for organization of transacting. Ho'*'ever, those transactions are
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to be qgfported by transaction specific capital contrarily for ordinary farm investments for
standardized (wholesale market) products. Besides those transactions are chancteized with less
frequency (relatively limited number of participant) and high uncertainty (new products, demands).
Since transactions are not standardized they hardly can be govern by market mode. Private modes io
carry out transactions between particular agents has a special values since they have cost saving
potential for both parties. Therefore, efforts are made for designing coordination and incentiv-e
structure of such bilateral or multilateral forms of transacting. That is how the organic production of
apples by a farm group in Nagano has been integrated through a contract mode with a consumer
cooperative from Nagoya. Farmers investments in special (non standard organic) production are
hiShlf transaction specific to interested consumers. For consumers this mode secures regular supply
of special products to meet their demands. Since the big interdependency and high frequency of
transactions a stable contract forms for their organization has been developed. It reduces risk of
market uncertainty and guarantees return on investments in transacting specifiC assets.
Smoke Cabin is well known brand name for meet products in Tsukuba. Livestock production
and processing of specially developed hams, sausages etc is organized by a farmer. Membership club
has been s9t gp for year around supply of brand name products. Also direct marketing on Setbu-site is
successfully introduced. There is also a consumer cooperative in Tsukuba which has-came up a result
of residence desire to get fresh, reduced chemical, and cheap farm products directly from producers.
Farmers are also interested in this direct private mode of transacting since they can get information
about consumer preferences and introduce new (organic) products. Advantage for farmers is that
unaccepted in wholesale markets high quality but non standard products can be sold through such
direct mode of transacting.
All these development changes the structure of costs of transacting and both market and long
term costs for setting up private modes of transacting relatively increase. Standards have been a good
device to save on transacting costs for farmers amd buyers of farm products. However, enormous
diversification of production has taken place. Single rice transactions fclr instance, have been replaced
by number.of characteristics which turn to be important for the organization. Nowadays diiferent
variety of rice, special technologies and locations of oroduction, and various rice products compete
with each other for resources and consumers. Results of this post standardization stage has been
increasing of non agrarian transactions on farm level, tight farm integration with proiessing and
distribution sectots, new modes for direct links with finai consumers. Oryanization oi interlinked
transactions become important way to compete for consumers. That is how different forms of agro
tourism have been invented and high interlinked of farm and service supply transactions have been
developed (farm holidays, farm rental zmd farm education, golf and hoise riding etc.). Complete
classification of forms of diversification in Japanese farming is made by Goto (Goto 1995, p. f fS;.
Howevet, increasingly the costs for less frequent and highly asset specific transactions are efiectively
organized through specialized market agents, Stands for chemical free farm products with declared
origin could be found in the all large department stores. Here the name of the store has a character of
brand name since the high quality of products are enforced by supplier.
Traditional value system in the Japanese rural community substantially has determined the
character of developed modes for economic transacting. Widespread distribution of informal
contracting based on oral agreements and enforced by community have been dominant in organization
of agrarian transactions. As one of interviewed farmers describes it "Japdnese farmers spend a lot of
time getting to agreement but once they complete negotiations self enforcement of contract is more
important than any formal system". In nonagrarian transactions this cultural background of strong self
enforcement of clauses of agreements has brought to a life specific forms for the organization of input
supply transactions in electronics, auto and textile industries.Well known subcontracting system Tor
vertical integration of small companies and households to the big industrial manufacturers has been
quite different mode from totally integrated industries of USA and Western Europe.
Hou,ever, recent liberalization of economy and fundamental transformation of farming into a
large scale business activity have been changing the haditional transaction structure as rn e11. High
mobility of agrarian resources becomes important feature of this transformation of farming. Big
number of participants from a large area are involved in agrarian transactions exchanging huge
amount of resources and activities. Farm size extension started to depend heavily on mobil resources
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like inputs, credit etc. Even land turns to be a great mobility as an object of frequent transactions
between different partners far way from neighborhood. More than any time before farmers use
anonymous market to organize their transactions and find their partners nationwide. Market
competition, uncertainty and less transacting between same parties increase bounded rationality and
possibility for opportunism. Risk for failure in a large business operations becomes very big to rely
on informal transacting modes. Farmers report that it is difficult finding neighbors to guarantee for
their loans. Family farm and inter generations transfer make the farm unstable rural institution similar
to other business formations. Moral hazard, opportunism and other terminologies of the Transaction
costs economy started to be used to explain new phenomenon tn organization of transactions in the
Japanese economy. In this conditions traditional community enforcement system has not been able to
deal with complex transacting between private agents. Farmers need and develop more complex
forms to facilitate their transactions in larger than community borders scale. In order to specify rights
and obligations of big number of participants written contracts form is extensively used. Besides
modern institution developed in rural areas (like bank, insurance companies etc) and they introduce
formal contracting as a transacting mode. New hybrid forms with substantial public, cooperative and
private investments have been developed and required formal distribution of responsibility and
liabilities. Also labor protecting legislation is involving agraian labor and even illegal foreign workers
get benefits from formal organization of transactions. Court system has been introducing for
resolution of complex agraian conflicts as well. All those developments have changed traditional
picture for organization of farm transactions. New business type modes have started to determine
structures for agrarian transacting.
According to the suryey in Nakatsubo more than 44o/o of questioned farmers plan some
organizational development in near future. All of them are business farmers. As a goal for such
development a half of the farmers put profit making while another half suppose economy of scale
through joint transactions. Agrocorporation Manager intends to increase farm operations up to 1"000
million yens through including trade activities. He also plans to open a marketing company as well as
a branch farm in another Prefecture. According to him a corporation will be the most appropriate form
for extension of agraian transactions and profit making is his single goal. Other full time farmers
intend to use farm groups as the mode for organizational development. For two third of them purpose
of this new form of transacting is to get economy of scale (reduce on distribution costs) through
processing and marketing. Another one third of the farmers plan to use group farming to extend
negotiating power and as a profit making organization. Two third of a1l farmers point out as the most
likely counterparts for joint organization of transacting their neighbors and friends.
Liberalization and intensification of agrarian transactions put big challenges before agricultural
cooperatives as well. Most of them have been trying to respond to those challenges of organizational
development through amalgamation. According to the Manager of the Yachio Machi Cooperative there
are three main reasons for merger: first, policy of the Prefectural and National Federations; Second,
easy access and effective use of the National Federation activities; Third, economy on management
costs. Among 6 previous cooperatives in the area only two have been profitable (not surprisingly one
of them was against the merger!). Therefore merger is also seen as a way to stabilize cooperative
finance. Besides merger is a manner to support efficient cooperative activities in the conditions of
constant decrease of the number of farms. Big policy issues of all visited by us cooperatives around
the country has been to increase the number of coop members. Since most of the farms are aheady
members of the cooperatives the tendency is to extend formal membership through increasing the
coops members per farm household.
One of the prime goal for extension of size of the cooperatives is to save on management
costs. According to plans of the management of the Yachio Machi Cooperative there will be more than
87o staff reduction in 5 years. In the Inan Agricultural Cooperative of Kamanageshi management
costs savings will be as much as 277o as a result of the merger. Thus in both cases some net cash
economy of transaction costs for reorganized modes is expected. Besides numbers of coops will
decrease as their operational size will become bigger. So transacting with the Federation will be easier
and some savings on coordinating costs nationwide wiil be made.
We doubt however, that enthusiasm after amalgamation of the cooperatives will give positive
results in any case. Since there in no universal size (and mode) for organization of al1 agraian
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transactions that is truth for the cooperatives reorganization as well. In order to evaluate the
transacting costs minimizing potential of old and new cooperative structures it is not enough to
measure direct cash savings on (internal) management costs. We are to include total costs of
transacting, namely costs for organization of transactions between owners and cooperative staff, and
costs for transacting with outside partners (suppliers and buyers) of the cooperatives.
Number of members in the Inan Cooperative after merger will be 27000.In Yachio machi
case the Cooperative members are more than 15000. Structure of transactions and costs associated
with it implicitly will change afte.l: the reorganization: First, coordination costs in such a large
organization would be much higher and decision making more difficult as a result of increasing the
number of participants in transactions. Second, possibilities for members to influence organizational
policy and development would decrease. Consequently less member oriented activity and
development of the cooperative as a separate entity can be expected. Third, some serious incentive
problems will definitely arise in such alarge and bureaucratic type organization. Traditional incentive
system of seniority promotion used to work well since the small cooperative's employees u,ete in
everyday ""y" control" from members. However, information asymmetry between internal
department as well as between staff and owners will substantially increase in a large scale of complex
activities. Consequently possibility for opportunism will become bigger and the effective control on
cooperative management would fall: cooperative will go far way from members. Recent involvement
of the agro cooperatives in the big Jusen crisis only shows the extent of possible passing u'ith
members interests.
Forth, there is not any technical reason to organize all service supply transactions in such an
equal (large) scale. Most effective size of machinery sewice for instance (potential of economy of
scale and scope) can be easily reached at low scale (small group, hamlet or village) levels. Besides
production costs reason management costs for such a small organizalion will be less than in a large
clumsy for coordination organization. For instance, extension of management of a Rice center beyond
its technicai capacity would impose only additional costs without any transacting benefits. There are
14 small and effective machinery utilization groups in Abashiri area. They own equipment and
coordinate all activities from seedling production to harvesting for each crops. Members in one such a
group organize 8 tractors supply transactions for their 270 ha. If farmers cultivate this area
individually they would need 20 tractors. Besides, there are 4 sub groups for large machinery
utilization. All machinery group in the area also coordinate rate and fee level, share experience how to
improve efficiency etc. Farmers in the area need no additional organization to coordinate their
activities.
Modem farms are quite big consumers of main inputs like fertilizers and chemicals. Thus a
small numbers and specialized input supply cooperative may explore economy of scale (and scope),
and to have enough negotiating powers with chemical company or other suppliers. It also u,ill be
flexible to members demand, and could organize all transaction effectively at low costs. Moreovet,
agraian inputs supply markets are well developed and standardized.In many cases there is not any
necessity for farmers to organize inputs supply through any organization. They either tend to use
direct market procurement or develop bilateral private modes for their inputs supply transactions.
Since there in no any uncertainty, assets specificity or unilateral dependency of transactions, no
reason for a special organization of transacting. Only reason for inputs supply through any big
organization such as a cooperative would be potential for some economy on cost of transacting, needs
for in house production of specialized inputs, economy on inputs storage facilities etc.
In the same way marketing transactions should be governed through different mode
depending on critical dimension of transactions. In big consumers regions like Tokyo and Osaka
farmers tend to transact directly on wholesale markets and they do not need any organization to
market through. In remote area marketing transacting through a farm groups or a big cooperative
could be advantage to save transportation, marketing and transacting costs. Kyushu farmers may need
own organizalion in orderto get to big markets. According to a survey namely marketing is put as a
major subject of the future management of existing farm groups in Japan (Ito 1991, p.47).However,
altemative market and private modes also can compete effectively for organization of marketing
transactions. Development of private collecting markets, direct marketing through post office system,
door to door delivery, marketing groups, consumer cooperatives etc are good examples in this
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respect. When marketing transacting are supported by mutually dependant assets then a special mode
(contract or total vertical integration) with processing or distributors tend to develop. When unilateral
dependency exists then a bargaining cooperative is the effective solution.
On the other hand for insurance and capital supply transactions even the big post merger scale
of the cooperatives is not large enough. Apparently nationwide organization of those transactions is
the most effective mode. However, here the role of a third part involvement through different public
programs for development of agriculture has become much more important. It changes substantially
structure of financing of agriculture as the role of nonfarm and public capital supply becomes crucial
for organization of the farm transactions. However, any institutional restrictions for modes that can be
chosen by farmers for organuation of capital supply transactions are not justified. Competition
between financial institutions to serve this third part involvement would increase quality of capital
supply transactions and reduce on current costs of transacting. Increasingly farmers tend to use
market rather than cooperative forms for organization of their capital supply and insurance
transactions. On the other hand abandon cooperative capital is more effectively used through market
than inter organizational modes. That is why cooperative banks and insurance institutions increasingly
find a big part of their clients among non farmers (general public).
Therefore, despite of the some economy of costs that will be realized after merger the total
costs of transacting less likely u,ill decrease. It is not possible a single or one size organization to
govem effectively zrll king of agrarian transactions. More effective approach would be to adjust the
size of the cooperatives up to the potential to get scale and scope economy. For capitai and insurance
supply transactions this size apparently has to be the national scale. Specialized national cooperative
bank with branches around the country will be a solution. No any ecomlmic reason to organize this
transaction through a joint (complex) mode with a quite different kind of transacting under the same
management. If members wont to carry out unprofitable cooperative activities it could be through
direct payment, bank loans etc but through a separate (special) mode.
Thus the optimal size of many transactions organized by cooperative mode could be
determined by technological parameters. Accordingly many activities would be effectively organized
by small local and regional specialized farmers organizations. There are plenty of farm groups with
different size in Japanese agriculture which explore effectively economy of scale through this private
mode. I-arge intensity of agrarian transactions allows a great part of input supply, service supply and
marketing to be through small local or regional farm organizations with different size. However, one
complex organization such as coop can not govern all transactions at any level since different effective
size for organization of various agrarian transactions. While the optimal size for machinery supply
transacting could be farm, neighborhood, hamlet or town lever, exploration of a modem fruit
selection center would be in a region, and a big feed or processing factory may serye farmers from a
very large area. Apparently not one big or small but various specialized organizations with different
size are necessary to govern agraian transactions. Any extension of those determined by technology
organization upward bears additional costs for transacting without technological advantages.
Extension (e.g.amalgamation) should take place only if any transaction costs economizing potential
exists and it is bigger than additional costs of transacting through new organization. Otherwise, no
economic reason to merge independent organizational modes.
Therefore, instead of the current shift of management functions upward efficiency could be
improve giving more autonomy to main branches of existing cooperatives (move dornnward).
Predominant current system of the pooling of income in a large scale is to be suspended and local
management should be given more operational freedom. In this way cooperative would be more
members instead of "federation" (as now) oriented. Such an organization of transactions could be
really directed, controlled and managed by owners. Incal managers would have the initiative how to
organize various transactions in best members interests. They would have more flexibility to adjust to
ctinent changes in the members demands. This mode would allow those organizations to be more
competitive since not for profit activities. In order to keep efficiency of organization some transactions
may be shift to other private or market forms according to their relative costs for members. For
instance, there are many cooperative supermarkets in Japan. Joint ownership mode used to be very
effective to supply this missing service in rural area. However, nowadays it is becoming difficult for
cooperatives to compete with newly developed chains of Jusko, Daiei etc. Cooperative mode can not
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meet members demands for cheap and better service which they get through market mode. That is
why this organization of transacting are to be suspended.
Suggested model of organizational development would give the local management the power
to select its outside contragents on the base of relative efficiency. Only when there are some
transacting advantages (less costs) they would transact with the Federation. When there is potential to
explore some transacting efficiency or overcome transacting difficulties they would join some regional
or national specialized organizations (cooperatives). Besides that they would developed others
bilateral modes to transact or would trade through market. Thus the size of extension of transacting
through the cooperative should be determined by members instead of up side down. In this way at
high level only long term transactions u'ill be coordinated such as research and development, large
scaie project development etc. Accordingly they will be set up as a project or peflnanent organizations
depending on frequency of transacting. Size of organization will be determined by interested farmers
and would be at neighborhood, hamlet, regional or national levels. Therefore, extent of centralization
of the cooperation management is to be determined by need @otential) to coordinate such long term
transacting links. Federation of Hokkaido Cooperatives for instance has a research farm on milk, soil
and feed projects. It also provides soil testing and dairy management information services.
It is not necessary to orgatize all transactions at high management level. Relationships
betq.een high and low levels of the cooperatives have to be equal (partners). Namely that is the
power of the cooperative mode of management (democracy) contrary to the firm form (bureaucracy).
High level management would be engaged less with service activities but predominately with
coordinating of transaction at this level. Prefectural Federation of Nagano cooperatives for instance
owns the brand name of mushroom but it has been developed by private company, production is at
farm level, marketing is through local branches. Only function for high level of management is to
keep brand name through extension, to enforce the brand name, to minimize on advertisement and
promotion costs. Therefore, role of the new management structure and justification for existence of
high levels of management could be coordination of the long term links and transactions with less
frequency, high uncertainty and assets specificity to members. As a matter of fact biggest efforts of
the Cooperative managerc happen to be on strategic and technological development and project
activities. (Table 16). According to the director of the local branch of the Cooperative in Miyata 80-
90% of his time last year was on coordination of project activity (building a new sides).
Beyond this technically determined first level farm organization further extension of the
cooperative size should take place only if some transaction costs minimizing potential exists.
Therefore, cooperative wiil become bigger in order to overcome some transacting difficulties or to
economize on costs of transacting. Extend of the process will depend on structure of agraian
transactions and their critical dimension such as uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity.
Accordingly effective organizational modes for various agraian transacting will differ and change.
That is why we expect that new big cooperatives in Japanese agriculture will be unstable modes of
transactions. They will tend to adjust to transaction cost minimizing potential through specialization
and splitting out. Otherwise they would be replaced by more effective for members private or market
modes. Therefore, instead of one multipurpose but not effective organization the transaction costs
economics prospects see a solution of the problem in many and with different size specialized
organizations.
- Necessity of high level coordination would arise when alarge trarrsacting specific capital is to
be invest and transactions are characterized with big uncertainty and frequency. For instance, that is
for development, organization of production, and marketing in nationwide scale of brand name
products. Marketing of the famous "twentieth century" pears from Nagano has been effectively
itrganized through Prefectural cooperatives level. Only at this level transacting costs for brand name
support, advertisement, marketing etc can be minimized. Also a special technology for mushroom
production has been developed and marketing of brand name product is organized by the Federation.
Apparently a specific and large joint ownership mode is necessary to organize transactions for
developm-ent, plomotion, distribution of capital intensive and transacting specific brand name
producls. Howrever, Prefectural organization can not govern all transactions effectly"ly.-Marketing
iransactions are organized at low level through a contract mode as in the case of Miyata branch for
instance. I-ong tern contract with a consumer cooperative in Nagoya specify monthly quantity of
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transactions, method of production and set up a formula for payments.
Next, purpose of such large scale cooperatives would be assistance in establishment of
different kind of farmers organizations for transacting. This role of a "third part" participation of the
cooperative in farmers organizing has had good tradition in Japan. Management of the Miyata branch
of the Inan Cooperative for instance initiated a new land use system. In order to develop effective fruit
production it assists land exchanges between farmers and land owners. When paddy is transferred to
orchard the cooperative arrange the same rent level. Also diversification of paddy production
(exchanges of quotas) which is on equal presented has been successfully coordinated by cooperative
or farm organizations.
Last, political lobbying at different levels could be successful only through high level of
coordination of farmers activities.
Many managers look for the solution of the current cooperative crisis through introducing of
new profit making activities. However, since such an organization of transactions is market rather
than members oriented the cooperative form is not the best one. If cooperative members want to
invest jointly in such public sewing activity they can use cooperative capital. However, it does not
mean that they have to organize all their transactions under a single (e.g.cooperative) mode.
Cooperative may set up a separate profit (or not for profit) making company with shares of some all
cooperative members. Which form will be chosen depends on king of transacting, on the incentive
and control futures of different modes, and ultimately on their transaction costs minimizing potential
for farmers.
Cooperative can successfully compete with other forms for organization of agrarian
transactions if they change their functions and incentive structure. There is plenty of room for
cooperative managers to provide new kind of service in the conditions of liberalizing rice market for
instance. Cooperative mode would be the most effective for many farmers to save costs of
transacting, to share marketing risk, or to use assets dependency from the cooperative facilities.
Cooperative role would be especially important to develop, organize extension and production, and
market local variety and brand name products etc. Introduction of new activities in farming like
changing products structure, processing, agro tourism, direct marketing is important direction to
improve efficiency of organizations.
Already mentioned third part involvement role of the cooperative in farm transacting rn'ill be
important. Designing and setting up of various farm organizations take increasingly big resources.
Cooperative experience, staff and resource potential, organizational structures, political power could
be effectively used. In this process the cooperative would be more like a third part partner to farmers
rather than as a specialized joint ownership mode. Since development of farming turns to be a major
community and national social problem such cooperative involvement will be increasingly in tight
collaborations with other farm organizations, local authorities and governmental agencies.
Fundamental changes in internal management structures could improve substantialiy efficiency
of existing cooperative organizations of agraian transactions. Already developed idea of giving
managerial and financial autonomy of local branches is one point. Second is introduction of merit
system of compensation of cooperative staff. Management of the Inan Cooperative is looking for such
direction and a special committee has been set up to develop such a system. Big problem is how to
evaluate the individual performance. Besides they need 70 million additionai yen to introduce such
system. In this process of restructuring of incentive system experience could be taken from internal
incentive structure of big industrial companies. Moreover introduction of merit system compensation
should not be connected only with one way movement of staff compensation movement (salary
increase). Potential of such a model of organization of internal transactions could not be realized
unless a variation of income level depending on performance results would not be applied.
Reorganization of management structure should contribute to real involvement of members
(owners) in cooperative management. This could be done through introducing of redemption policy
of cooperative capital for instance. Current return back of invested in the cooperative shares would
increase members concern in cooperative matters and would involve them in organizational activities.
Suspension of practice of accumulation of dividends and total cash return would increase members
incentives to take part in the cooperative management. Distribution of the dividends according to the
business with the cooperative also will involved members in cooperative matters. All those would
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increase interest of cooperative members in effective management of their invested capital in the
organization.
Measures also have to be taken to decrease information asymmetry through the organization.
Since it is not possible direct individuals control on the management discloser of information to
members and to the public must be enforced by a third part. Only when owners have got full
information they can effectively take part in the management. That is why reliability of such
information has to be guaranteed and enforced by Law.
Community movement of the cooperative is associated with increasing the number of part time
farmers and diversification of their interests. Community orientation approach is taken as strategy for
future development of the Inan Cooperative for instance. Cooperative develops activity to serve
general public like cable television, gas station, create jobs etc. Accordingly 30-407o of the managers
time is for such outside (public) relationships with schools, business groups, municipality etc.
Cooperative in Tsukuba set up a Civic garden where residence can practice farming on small plots.
That is an example for a new king of service to community. Also new organization of agrarian
resource is introduced: land is leased in from farmers, farmers are involved in consultation activities
etc. Besides through this mode consumer preferences are carefully studied and cooperative policy
improved.
A[ this put a new direction for improvement of the management structure of cooperatives.
They are not any more pure farmers organization since many transacting parties are involved.
Cooperative is a big farmers organization but it is also a great employer, it is involved heavily in
community service, it assists implementing public policy etc. However, this mix structure of
transactions in large scale cooperatives faces big managerial disabilities since existing conflicts of
basic interests of different category of members (young - retired, fuli time - part time - farm groups,
etc), between owners and employees, managers, consumers etc. In order to harmonize emetging
conflicts of transactions through this organization a special innovation in management structure is to
be made. For instance, representation of all interested groups in the Management Board of
cooperatives could answer challenges that traditional management structure faces. Accordingly not
only owners farmers but employees, costumers, community, public have to take part in formulation
of the policy of development and in direct management of the cooperatives.
In the new conditions of overall liberalization there shouid be a substantial changes in the
forms of public involvement in agrarian transactions as well. Direct third part interventions in agrarian
transactions has been dominant in post war years as it has been direct control on inputs supply
(e.g.paddy under cultivation) and marketing transactions for rice, strict regulations of lease and
purchase land markets etc. This out of date Government policy should give way for more assistance
role for transactions between private agents. For instance, third part involvement in suppiying
information about markets and prices, for trends in consumers demand, for available new
technologies and methods of productions etc, would increase efficiency of market transactions. Also
improvement of quality standards for farm products and animal feed could be response to public
concern for food safety. Effective control and enforcement of those standards by third party would
decrease uncertainty of market transactions and would intensify transaction through market modes.
Recent innovationi of food labeling, and improvement of chemical tolerance levels for farms
products, and guidance for organic and reduced chemical farming, are good examples for such
effective Governmental involvements in transactions on market place.
Government policy should be shifted toward less direct regulations of different types of
private transactions. Farmers should be given chance to chose the most effective modes for
transacting as well as to design appropriate organizalions for transacting with other individuals. In
this way there would be less institutional limits for private entrepreneurship to extend farm size
through organization of more agraian transactions under farm management. Current Government
intervention in inputs supply and marketing transactions support to the great extend the average
farmers. As a result widespread part time farming rather than business farms have been formatted.
Agrarian policy should not restrict economic agents in agriculturc to realize their personal potential to
manage farm transactions and develop farm specific capital. As a result some of the farmers will be
goodhanagers and they will extend farm size to explore potential of the farm specific capital through
internal mode. Some farmers will become good suppliers of contract services and they increase
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internal size of agraian transactions around this specific capital. Some of the farmers will be good
labors and they would get maximum return on their specific skills. Those who do not posses farm
specific capitai would quite farming. This opportunity would allow agrarian agents to take part in
more transactions through the most effective for them forms. As a result specialization and
concentration of farms will accelerated and more intensive transactions will be carried out.
lnstitutional restrictions for setting up private mode that farmers find effective for organization
of their agraian transactions should be removed. Individuals are to be allowed to organize farming in
different from family farm forms like corporation, joint ventures, limited companies etc and take
advantage of control and incentive features of those modes. Besides all forms of transacting should be
given equal legal rights, appropriate access to public programs etc. That will increase potential of
development since the most effective transacting mode will be designed for bilateral and multilateral
agranan transactions. As a result the farm size will extend both through big share of integral
transacting as well as through various outside private modes and organizations. Overall transactions
that farmers are involved in and managed will go up. This will increase potential of market and private
mode of transactions. As market experience and managerial abilities of farmers increase than their
human capital specificity to standardized farm operations will decrease and more market transactions
can be expected. Accordingly they will be able to extend farm size through more market and service
supply around their farm specific capital. Thus farm size will be gradually adjusted along with
learning by doing experience of farm managers. In this respect there is an important role for a public
third part involvement through extension education, price information and institutional support for
effective development of private and market agraian transactions.
Building of safeguard against uncertainty in development of international markets and national
food security should be important part of Government market intervention. However, less expensive
modes should be applied for organization of such national agrarian transacting. High public demand
on quality of imported foods comparable with Japanese standards should be enforced by the
Government. Also minimum domestic food supply as national food security measure should be
guaranteed through Government intervention. Apparently the minimum (protecting) scale of
organization of farm production in the country is a big public demand. Government is to set up
criteria for national food supply and organize transacling for meeting this public goals. However,
instead of previous direct regulation of production and import more effective modes for the
Government involvement could be chosen such as like tariffs, stock keeping, financing of farm
development programs, public support for agricultural research and extension etc.
For instance, as altemative for inefficient proportional supply by all rice farms (production
adjustment scheme) the Government may announce stock keeping needs at the beginning of each
season. Interested farmers will prepare and present projects to take governments order. Only best
projects with minimal price offered by farmers will be accepted. In this way market like mode u'ill be
used to organize transactions and to minimize on transaction costs through effective involvement of
Government and farmers and in the best interests of consumers. First, this would increase price
competition between farmers to get Government orders which will guarantee more effective use of
available resources. Second, public demand for food security will be meet at less costs since only
most effective plans will be included in the Government scheme. Third, this competition will be at pre
production stage and only the most effective projects will actually be accepted and realized. Now
policy give no preferences for good or bad production and in fact it harms good farmers and
benefiting bad farmers. Forth, price level of the Government order will be formed by efficiency
principle, and heated political discussions what should the price level and price formula be will be
overcome. Next, this policy will give freedom for good farmers to develop rice farming to meet
effectively the Government plans. Besides all farmers will be free to invest in rice production to meet
market demands taking all risk and benefits. In this way individuals will be free to organize their
transactions through public, market or private modes they find as most effective. There will be no any
institutional restrictions for farmers to develop rice production and improve its efficiency. Apparently
this policy will be much more effective since it explores potential that all mode of transactions contain.
Namely both Government and voluntarily marketed rice production wiil be coordinated by market.
Ultimalely efficiency will increase since only effective rice farmers will be able to compete and food
security will be achieved at less costs for taxpayers. Costs for organization of this Govemment
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involvement in transaction will decrease and both producers and consumers will benefit.
In the same way environmental preservation and protection programs should be a big third
part Government involvement in transactions. However, farme$ are to be free to participate in such
program and to chose the most effective modes to meet announced by the Government programs
goals. All economic agents are to be free to compete for Government programs.They will develop and
offer different forms for organization of this transactions like appropriate changes in production
structure or direct protecting activities (e.g.forestry instead of farming). Oniy individuals or groups
projects which meet Government goals at least costs will be accepted. Government programs and
participation of economic agents should not be understand only as direct financing but as indirect
support measures, mandatory standards for environmentally friendly farming etc.
Suggested direction for improvement of the modes for the Government intervention find their
bases in technological development. When technology is standardized and product is not diversified it
is not difficult to coordinate transactions at high level. However, when product diversification
increases and transactions become complex it is impossible to coordinate prices, production,
technology etc at high hierarchical level. Accordingly direct third part intervention in agranan
transacting comes up to be expensive and restrict getting the potential than market and provide modes
have. For instance there are number of materialized monuments of ineffectively spent public money in
some dairy farms in Hokkaido. Big investments for introduction of special technology in silos by the
Ministry were made and they happened to be unproductive. That is why those silos have not been use
at all. Therefore, only strategic links have to be coordinated at national level connected with food
security, consumers protection, environmental preservation and farmers public goods demands.
Initiatives of individuals have to be mobilized to meet those social goals and market demands through
giving them freedom to organize agraian transactions through any modes. In this way potential of
market and private modes for organization of current transactions will be effectively used by all
participants according to their interests.
Second fundamental direction for policy changes should be to give more autonomy for local
authority in order to involve them in agraian transactions. Since development of farming becomes
important part of community life local agencies will have opportunity to develop appropriate policy
and set up necessary forms for involvements. Ilcal Governments are closer to residence needs and
they could be easily influence to respond to peoples demand for their third part involvements. That is
why they are to have power (autonomy) to develop such modes for involvements in agrarian
transactions from local importance. This changes would guarantee effective organization of third part
public involvement as low costs. There are plenty of examples for effective third part involvements of
local authorities. As a result importance of hybrid modes of organization of agraian transactions rn'ith
public, cooperative, farmers and consumers participation increases substantially. For example Obihiro
Public Corporation has been set up by local government and farm cooperative in order to economize
on dairy production, to develop original products from Obihiro, and to provide technical service to
farmers. Only 527o of the income of the corporation come from service fees and profit making
activities. This form for organization of transactions allows effective use of public pasture at large
scale, creates extra income for far.mers and residence, contributes for presewing the beautiful scenery
of countryside, brings visitors from all around the nation, and adjusts technoklgy to the
interorganisational needs. Thus technological development, farming, processing and direct marketing
transactions are effectively coordinated with supply of non economic benbfits for the local residence.
Development of international markets and competition with cheap foreign products can not be
sloped Besides country has to meet its GATT obligations and to open its markets for farm products.
Also increasingly Japanese food companies have been investing overseas to overcome Government
restrictions for direct import of farms products through organization of food import transactions. On
the other hand overseas producers have started to adjust production structure according to quality
preferences of Japanese consumers and they are introducing Japanese varieties of rice, apples, beef
etc to use potential of market transactions in the country. Competition on agrarian markets becomes
strong and this process can hardly be avoid. Ultimately consumers make everyday judgmenls and no
government intervention could stop them to buy cheap and quality.products. Like in other industries
there are not once for ever seats in agraian markets and position must be defended. One direction to
increase market share of domestic products is to offer transactions which are supported by highly
68
specific capital. Freshness of farm products is one such asset and overseas competition hardly can
meet consumers demand for many domestic products. However, as a result of revolutionalisation in
transportation and presewation technologies freshness would gradually loss its character of highly
specific capital.
Second, potential of interlinked forms of farm transactions with various service supply will be
very big since it contributes to high asset specificity. For instance, consumers demand to enjoy
Sakurajima volcano and get this externality transactions along with consumption of farm products
from Kagoshima area hardly can be met through import.
Next direction for increasing the efficiency of domestic agrarian transactions comes from the
system of agrarian research and development. Final products from the innovation system (nern'
products and technologies) have character of national specific capital and they could not be imported
from international markets. Therefore, intensification of agraian transactions u'ith innovation system
are ultimate source of unlimited increase of competitiveness of domestic production. In this respect
the importance of innovation sphere for development of the national agrarian transactions would
relatively increase in the future. Here the Government third part role to assist development of agrarian
research potential is very big in respect of direct support of public system research and extension.
Also institutional modemization which would facilitate development of different private forms of
agranan research and development (e.g. agraian intellectual rights legislation and enforcement) will
substantially extend the potential to intensify agraian innovation transacting through various modes.
Framework for increasing of the collaboration between public, cooperative, and private agents, as
well as for development of various hybrid forms of coordinations of transactions is to be extended as
well. Many examples for such effective joint mode of innovations can be found in Japanese
agriculture .
In order to get a full picture of the structure of agrarian transacting we should include the big
numbers of non business farms. Prospects for development of transactions through this mode would
be quite different from the real business farms. Number of individuals who are involved in farming as
a favorite free time occupation or lifestyle after retirement tend to increase. Accordingly they
participate in agrarian transactions in order to get extra income, and increasingly for internal
consumption or to get non economic benefits. Farming is more part of the utility function of those
individuals rather then business mode for transacting. Those individuals support their farms in the
same manner like some people build a tunis ground in their gardens to play favorite game or cultivate
flowers to make their back gardens beautiful. That is why this farms ate an internal mode for
organization of transactions for final individual consumption. Therefore extension of agrarian
transactions through such mode is limited (by individuals demands of such activity). Despite the big
number of participants the economic importance and costs associated with those kind of agrarian
transacting will relatively decreased. Accordingly quite different from agraian policy should be
undertaken for public involvements is such transactions. This policy is to be restricted to eventual
regulations of personal final consumption, and increasingly to public organization of the effective
reproduction of natural resources (land, environment etc).
As a reason for engagement in farming all full time farmers in Nakatsubo hamlet point out that
it is their main sours of income. For one third of farmers preservation of the farm for the future
generation, and farming as favorite lifestyle has been reasons (Table 19). For part time farmers
supplementing income and consumption of farm products have been also important. As far as future
is concerned, main sours of income and preservation of farms will be important for full time farmers.
For part time farmers supplement of income and consumption of farms products will be main reasons
for farm activity.
Asked about future role of the Japanese farming most of interviewed farmers in Nakatsubo
think that local and national farming will remain unchanged (Table 20). While more than one fifth of
questioned believe that future of the local agriculture will increase none of interviewed farmers think
Co for Japanese farming. Most of farmers believe that number of (real) farms will decrease and farm
size will increase.
As far as their preferences for agricultural policy are. concerned more than a half of
interviewed farmers want more supportive Government policy (Table 2l). According to the Manager
of the big Agrocorporation every farmer has been supported by the Government. However, future
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agrat'ran policy should be selective and only good farmers "farmers with spirit" are to be supported.
There is a very interesting split up in opinions in a two generations business farm. According to the
farther, a retired but still actively involved farmer, Government agraian policy should be more
supportive. However, his successor and young manager of the farm believe that policy is to be
liberalized. Thus modern business farmers and young generation managen see bright perspectives for
the Japanese agriculture contrary to the dominant pessimistic view.
Table 19 Reason for Engagement in Farming (per cent*)
Source: Personal interviews
* More than one answer
Table 20 Future role of Japanese agriculture (per cent)
Period Reasons Agrocorporation Business farms Part time farms All group























































Table 2L Preferences for Governmental Agrarian Policy
Source :Personal interviews
Answers Agrocorporation Business farmers Part time farmers All group
More supportive 100 50 50 55.6
Same as now 50 l.t.1
Difficult to specify 33.3 )))
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